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Functional Divisions and Other Corporate
Separations Under Section 355 After

Rafferty
JOHN

w. LEE

0

Two OF the prerequisites for application of section 355, the
exclusive vehicle for tax-free fragmentation of a single corporation, are meeting the active business tests and passing the
anti-bail-out device test.1 For almost a decade the question whether
section 355 permitted functional divisions of a functionally or
vertically integrated business enterprise, i.e., a business in which
a single entity controls all the functional stages in an industry
from top to bottom, was unresolved.2 Although the regulations defining an active business for purposes of section 355 seem to deny
such status to components of a functionally integrated corporation,3 commentators thought such divisions were consonant with
the purpose of the active business test.4 The issue is now answered.
The First Circuit in Rafferty v. Commissioner G has recently held
*JoHN W. LEE, (A.B., University of North Carolina 1965; LL.B., University of
Virginia 1968; LL.'M. (Taxation), Georgetown University 1970) is n membl'r of the Bar
of Virginia and associated with the firm of Hirschler and Fleischer, Riehmond, Virginia.
1 I.R.C. §§ 355(a)(1)(C) and 355(b); 355(a)(1)(B). A spin-off is similar to n
dividend with each shareholder receiving a pro rata share of the stock of the spun·ofi'
corporation while retaining his stock in the distributing corporation. A split-off is
similar to a stock redemption with the distributee sbarebolders surrendering all or n
portion of their stock in the distributing corporation for stock of the controlled
corporation. The stock of the split-off corporation need not be distributed pro rata. A
split-up is similar to a complete liquidation witb the parent corporation distributing
stock of two or more subsidiaries to its stockholders as a plan of complete liquidation.
See genertilly Jacobs, The .t!natomy of a Spin·Off, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-3; Morris,
Combining Divisive and .t!malgamating Jleorgani::ations: Section 355 Fails .t!oain, 40
TEXAs L. REV. 315, 316 (1968).
2 Lee, Section 482 and the Integrated Business Enterprise, 57 VA. L. REV. 137G (1971).
3 Reg. §§ 1.355-1(c) and (d) Exs. 2, 5, 11 and 12.
4 See, e.g., Whitman, Draining tlw S<Tbonian Bog: .d. N cw .t1pproacl1 1o Corporate
Separations Under the 1954 Code, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1194, 1221-23 (1908); Ynsseo,
Section 855: Disposal of Unwanted .t!ssets in Connection with a Reorganization, 22
TAX L. REV. 439, 460-64 (1967); Jacobs, T11C .d.natomy of .d. Spin·Off, 1907 Duhe
L.J. 1, 25-28.
s 452 F.2d 767 (1st Cir. 1971), c<Tt. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3617 (Juno 27, 1972).
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that functional divisions of an existing business can actively conduct separate trades or businesses.
In Rafferty a steel processing and distributing corporation had
transferred its business premises to a newly formed subsidiary
(Teragram) which then leased the premises back to its parent
under a long-term lease. Teragram subsequently built a plant on
raw land it had purchased and leased the plant to another related
corporation. Shortly thereafter (which happened to be :five years
and two months after the initial transfer of the steel business
premises), the parent spun off the Teragram stock for the primary
purpose of facilitating its dominant shareholder's estate planexclusion of his many daughters from the management of the
steel business and at the same time providing them with investment assets insulated from the fluctuations of the steel business.
The Tax Court held, rejecting the Commissioner's arguments to
the contrary, that the estate planning motive constituted a valid
nontax reason for the separation and spin-off of Teragram. 6 It
further held, however, that Teragram was not engaged in the active
conduct of a trade or business for the :five year period preceding
distribution and that, regardless of the valid business purpose
of the transaction, the parent's shareholders had extracted passive, investment type assets thereby bailing out earnings and
profits of both corporations and, hence, the transaction constituted a ''device.''
The First Circuit affirmed the Tax Court but did so within a
completely different conceptual framework. Whereas the lower
court had found a business purpose for the spin-off but had
denied tax-free treatment principally on the basis of the Commissioner's active business regulations (with some indication that
transactions with related parties only or renting property could
not constitute the active conduct of a trade or business), the
appellate court was disturbed by the "somewhat uncritical nature
of the Tax Court's :finding of a business purpose'' and liberalized,
indeed deemphasized, the active business test by restricting it
to a showing of objective criteria manifesting that entrepreneurial
activities quantitatively and qualitatively distinguished the corporate operations from mere investments-a test which the taxpayers did not pass. As a concomitant of this approach, the
First Circuit made the device test a more formidable barrier to
tax-free divisions. For under its formulation of the device test,
if a distribution has considerable potential for use as a device for
6

Joseph V. Rafferty, 55 T.C. 490 (1970).
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distributing earnings and profits (where for example the assets
of one of the postdistribution corporations have a readily realizable value and their sale does not impair the ta.~payer's equity
interest in the other corporation), the distribution will not qualify
for tax-free treatment under section 355 on the basis of shareholder motives unless those motives are germane to the continuance of the corporate business. The taxpayers also failed this test.
This article examines the Rafferty resolutions of most of the
controversies under the active business and device restrictions in
the context of their earlier development and considers probable
answers to remaining questions including the status of the existing
active business and device regulations under the court's restatement of these requirements. The active business concept is dealt
with first because it had traditionally been thought to be the
primary barrier to tax-free divisions, particularly functional
divisions.
Active Business Requirement
BAcKGROUND-THE

Rafferty

CASE

The active business prerequisites for nonrecognition of gain in
a corporate separation under section 355 are (1) immediately
after the distribution of stock in a controlled or spun-off corporation, the distributing and spun-off corporation must be ''engaged
in the active conduct of a trade or business" and (2) such businesses must have been actively conducted during the five-year
period ending on the date of distribution.7 The terms ''active
conduct of a trade or business" and "trade or business" are,
however, nowhere defined in the Internal Revenue Code. Consequently, the definition in the regulations came to be of paramount
importance:
[F]or purposes of section 355, a trade or business consists of a specifie
existing group of activities being carried on for the purpose of earning
income or profit from only such group of activities, and the activities
included in such group must include every operation which forms a
part of, or a step in, the process of earning income or profit from such
group. Such group of activities ordinarily must include the collection
of income and the payment of expenses. It does not include(1) The holding for investment purposes of stock, securities, land or
other property, including casual sales thereof (whether or not the
proceeds of such sales are reinvested),
(2) The ownership and operation of land or buildings all or sub7

I.R.C. § 355(b)(l).
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stantially all of which are used and occupied by the owner in the operation of a trade or business, or
(3) A group of activities which, while a part of a business operated
for profit, are not themselves independently producing income even
though such activities would produce income with the addition of other
activities or with large increases in activities previously incidental· or
insubstantial.s

This definition is illustrated by examples, a number of which indicate that the components of an integrated business previously conducted by a single corporation do not constitute an active business
or are not contin-uing the active conduct of the trade or business
formerly conducted by the predivision single corporation.0
The authority of these regulations was questioned by commentators on the grounds that they appeared to rest at least in part
upon another p:r:ovision of the regulations 10 that prohibited application of section 355 to the division of a single business, but which
had been rejected in the landmark case of Edmund P. Coady. 11
Furthermore, the other th'eories which might be formulated from
results stated in these regulations to support the conclusion that
functional divisions of vertically integrated corporations cannot
actively conduct separate trades or businesses were not thought. t.o
be mandated by the purpose, as announced by Coady, of the active
business requirement: "to prevent the tax free separation of
active and inactive assets into active and inactive corporate entities." 12 Accordingly, commentators uniformly concluded that
section 355 did apply to divisions of a vertically integrated corporation. The Tax Court, however, in several post-Coady decisions 13 approved the main definitional portion of the regulations
and in several cases that appeared to involve functional divisions
"carefully avoided the implications of the Coady rationale by
finding that the separated activities constituted an independent
sReg. § 1.355-1(e).
s Reg. § 1.355-1(d) Exs. 2, 5, 11 and 12.
10 Reg. § 1.355-1(a).
1135 T.C. 771 (1960), aff'a per curiam, 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961), nonacq., Rov.
Rul. 61-198, 1961-2 C.B. 61, nonacq. revoked, Rev. Rut. 64-147, 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1)
136. See Cohen, Current Partial Liquidation ana Spin-Of! Problems, 41 T~Es 775, 779780 (1963).
12 Edmund P. Coady, 35 T.C. 771, 777 (1960). See E. Ward King, 55 T.C. 077 1
696 (1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1972).
1a E. Ward King, 55 T.C. 677, 696 (1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1972);
Andrew M. Spheeris, 54 T.C. 1353, 1362 (1970), af!'d, 461 F.2!l 271 (7th Cir.
1972); Patricia W. Burke, 42 T.C. 1021, 1028 (1964).
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five-year-old business or came within the 'geographical' concept
of the Ooady case." 14
The First Circuit in Rafferty has now confirmed the view that
the correctness of section 1.355-1 (c) and the examples contained
in section 1.355-1(d) of the regulations is questionable in light
of the Ooady rejection of the separate business restriction. The
court pointed out that a broad reading of the phrase in the regulations that excludes from the active business definition activities
which were not themselves independently producing income was
largely a restatement of the erroneous separate business requirement and believed the Ooady rationale also applicable to functional
divisions of existing businesses.111
Had the appellate court said no more, ambiguity might have
arisen as to whether its objections extended beyond the independent production of income aspects of the regulations. However,
the Rafferty court further stated that the provisions were so
broadly drawn as to be inconsistent with congressional purpose
in some instances. .An illustration was that "the regulations could
be construed to deny [section] 355 treatment to a large hotel chain
which spun-off its land purchasing, hotel construction, and leasing
activities from its hotel management operations if the spun-off
corporation leased the completed hotels exclusively to the management corporation. We are reluctant to approve such regulations
which appear to fly in the face of Congressional intent.'' 1° Cases
such as Bon-sall v. Oo-mmissioner,11 Theodore F. Appleby,18 and
Isabel A. Elliot 19 had held that operation of owner-occupied real
estate primarily used in the principal business of the distributing
corporation during the five year predisposition period did not
qualify as an active business and that the activities connected
with rental income from outsiders were too incidental to constitute
14 BITTKER &

EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CO!U'Oil.ATIONS All'D SIIMlE·

HOLDERS ~

13.04, at 14 (3d ed. 1971). Under the geoprapbie rule (contained in Ecction
1.355-1(d) examples 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, and perhaps 10, of the regulations) if the businezs
operations in one geographic area are virtunlly complete in tllemselves, similar opera·
tions in a different geographic locale constitute n. separate business. Thla test has been
rejected by Lockwood's Estate v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 712, 71G (8th Cir. 1905).
A similar test is applicable in determining business purpose under sections 2G9 and
1551. See also Reg. §§ 1.382(a)-1(h) (5) and (6) (substantially same trade or business
and changes in location); Dubin, Unscrambling an Acquisition, 49 TAXES 849, s:m
(1971).
15452 F.2d at 772 n.10; accord, King v. Comm'r, 458 F.2d 245 (Gth Cir. 1972).
16 452 F.2d at 772 n.12.
11 317 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1963}.
1s 35 T.C. 755, 764 (1961), aff'd, 296 F.2d 925 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
910 (1962).
19 32 T.C. 283 (1959).
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an active business; therefore, the spun-off real estate rental business was lacking the requisite five year history. Furthermore,
separately incorporating and aging for five years the rental activities would not in substance differ from the operation of owner
occupied real estate.20 Under this rationale, as long as a spun-off
corporation's leasing activities were limited to related parties, it
could not satisfy the postdistribution active business requirement
either. Thus, the First Circuit, in giving its imprimatur to a functional separation of previously owner-occupied real estate which
is thereafter leased back to the distributing corporation, has not
only overruled the proviso of the regulations that owner-occupied
real estate does not constitute an active trade or business but has
also cast considerable doubt upon the reasoning of Bonsall,
Appleby and Elliot.
Equally significant is the assumption inherent in the example
contained in the Rafferty opinion that a spun-off corporation dealing only with related entities can nevertheless be engaged in the
active conduct of a separate trade or business.21 This dictum in
Rafferty has since become the Sixth Circuit's implicit conclusion
in King v. Gommissioner/2 a recent section 355 decision strongly
molded by Rafferty. Of prime importance to the Tax Court's
conclusion below that the rental real estate activities of the spunoff corporations did not qualify as active businesses was that they
all rented to a related tenant only. The review court in King reversed the Tax Court on the active business issue without even
commenting on this fact, except to express considerable reservation as to the validity of the "imprecise" active business regulations and their independent production of income requirement. 113
Having disposed of the active business regulations, the appellate
court in Rafferty set forth its own formulation of the active business requirement: ''a corporation must engage in entrepreneurial
20 E. Ward King, 55 T.C. 677, 700 n.9 (1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1972);
Lee, "Active Conduct" Distinguished from "Conduct" of a Rental Rea! Estate Busi·
ness, 25 TAX LAWYER 317, 328 (1972).
21 Elliot, Appleby and Bonsall have been approvingly read to deny activo business
status "unless a substantial portion of the gross income attributable to [ r<'ntnl]
property is derived from other than related corporations." Mnssco, Section 365: Dis·
posaZ of Unwanted Assets in Connection with a Reorganization, 22 TAX L. REV. 439,
457-59 (1967). In an interesting reversal of traditional positions tho taxpayer, in
Hanson v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mont. 1971), conceded that real estate
leased after the division to a related corporation did not constitute an "activo"
business; in Elliot the government conceded that it did.
22 458 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1972), reversing 55 T.C. 677 (1971).
2a 458 F.2d at 249.
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endeavors of such a nature and to such an extent as to qualitatively distinguish its operations from mere investments. :Moreover, there should be objective indicia of such corporate operations." 24 The spun-off corporation (Teragram) in Rafferty failed
the first part of this test. During the first four years of the
five year predisposition period Teragram had leased back to its
parent its only asset, the business premises used by the parent,
for a fixed return, i.e., under a net lease, "an activity, in economic
terms, almost indistinguishable from an investment in securities." 25 The spun-off corporation also failed the "objective indicia" component of the court's bipartite active business test.
During this same period it paid neither salaries nor rent, did not
employ independent contractors and its only activities were collecting rent, paying taxes and keeping separate books. The court
did not reach the more difficult question in its view: whether
Teragram 's activities during the fifth year of the five year predisposition period when it purchased unimproved real estate and
financed and built a plant, and incurred substantial repair expenses, constituted an active trade or business.
EFFECT oF

Rafferty

ON RECENT AcTIVE

BusiNESS CASES

Activities Performed by Independent Contractor

The Tax Court in Rafferty had stated that although the fact
that Teragram had financed the construction through a mortgage
on which it alone was liable was an indication of some independent
activity by Teragram, it was by no means conclusivc.20 This
452 F.2d at 772.
452 F.2d at 772. The appellate opinion never c.~licitly categorizes the lcnso in
question as a net lease; however, its terms as set forth in the opinion below (le,;see to
pay fixed monthly rent and all taxes and to maintain nnd repair premises) manifest that
it was a net lease, i.e., all or virtually all c."penses, such as maintenance, repairs and
taxes were paid by the lessee. Insur:mce and some taxes (for which the subsidiary '~as
apparently reimbursed) were paid by the lessor. Joseph V. Rafferty, lili T.C. 490, 491-9!!,
499 (1970). See E. Ward King, 55 T.C. 677, 697-98, (1971), rcv'd, 458 F.!:!d 245 (Utb
Cir. 1972). While ownership of property leased under a net lease may in economic
terms be almost indistinguishable from an investment in securitie2, n legal distinction
has developed in ascertaining whether ownership and operation of rental real estate con·
stitutes a trade or business. Where securities are owned, the stockholder cannot claim
the income generating activities as his own in determining his trade or businc,;s status,
whereas the activities of operating rental real estate nrc imputed to the. owner. See
Lee, "Active Conduct" Distinguished from "Coniluct" of a Rental Ileal Estate
Business, 25 TAX LAWYER 3171 323 (1972).
26 .Toseph V. Rafferty, 55 T.C. 490, 499 (1970).
24

2s
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could have meant the court felt the activities did not constitute
the active conduct of a trade or business or, as is more likely in
view of its subsequent decision in E. Ward King,21 they were not
in substance its own activities. In King the taxpayer maintained
that the acquisition, financing and construction of terminals,
leased by the subsequently spun-off subsidiaries on a net lease
basis to their parent, constituted the active conduct of a trade or
business. The Tax Court held that the subsidiaries performed
the activities in name only-they were performed by employees
of the parent. The court implicitly disregarded the separate existence of the subsidiaries.28 In doing so the Tax Court overlooked
a closely analogous and contrary trend in the case law development
under the active business provisions of section 921(2). A recurring issue in these cases is whether sales made by an export.
subsidiary of a United States manufacturing corporation constitute the active conduct of a trade or business where the flubsidiary has no staff of its own, but instead relies upon the parent
to supply salesmen and other staff. The courts have uniformly
held that the lack of a complete employee organization does not
in and of itself preclude qualification. Thus, for example, th<'
active trade or business requirement has been held satisfied where
the subsidiary paid a management fee for services rendered and
the subsidiary had at least one employee who kept its books and
reviewed all of its paper work.29
The Rafferty appellate opinion speaks indirectly to this arc>a.
In its discussion of the ''objective indicia'' portion of the bipartite
active business test it adopted, the court noted that the spun-off
corporation had not employed independent contractors. The court
thereby implicitly answered the question whether the active conduct of a trade or business for purposes of section 355 is pres<'nt
where the major entrepreneurial activities, such as leasing, repair55 T.C. 677 (1971).
55 T.C. at 699-700 (''On brief the petitioners urge us not to illsreg:ml tiH• snnrt!ty
of the corporate entity, but, on facts such as tltosl' prcsenteil hl'n•, tho ilopondl'nco
of the sulJsidiary corporations serves to underline the pl'titiont>rs' fniluro to show tho
active conduct of a business"); Nott>, Section 355 '.~ .Actit•e Business Rule-.An Ollt·
dated Inefficacy, 24 VAND. L. REv. 955, 985 (1971). The Sixth Circuit so ~OtH'Illd(•d on
appeal and reversed the Tax Court on this point, 458 F.2d at 248.
20 See, e.g., Frank v. International Canadian Corp., 308 F.2il 525 (9th Cir. 1!162);
A.P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383 (Ct. CJ. 1960), Tho sub·
sidiaries in King had a single employee in the first three years of tho fivo yonr pro·
distribution period and later paid tiJCir common parent a managl'ml'nt feo for such
services. However, the acquisition, financing and construetion activities Wl'ro por·
formed by employees of the parent who were also officers of the subshlinrios but wero
not compensated by them for their services.
27

2s
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ing and maintenance, are conducted by an independent contractor
rather than by an employee of the corporation owning the property. While under some other active business provisions, the
operation of a rental real estate business does not constitute an
active business if the rental activities are performed by an independent contractor,30 it was thought that supervision of such
independent contractors might constitute the active conduct of
a trade or business under section 355.31 Moreover, some judicial
development under section 355 suggested that a business could
be actively conducted by a third party,32 and it was well established
under the usual trade or business provisions that management and
rental activities of an agent or independent contractor on behalf of
an owner were imputed to the owner in determining his trade or
business status.33
Although use of an independent contractor might appear to
place a corporation more in the position of a passive investor, it
certainly does not make the corporate assets used in the business
any less active and, as discussed below, corporate assets should be
the primary focus of the active business test, for that is where
the bail-out potential lies.34 Thus the Rafferty court's implicit
resolution of this issue was in agreement with its general adoption
of a transactional approach under which the active business and
device tests are applied in accordance with their underlying purpose-prevention of a bail-out-and its opposition to the tendency
of these tests to develop independent significance apart from
this purpose.35 :Moreover, Hanson v. United Staies,::.o a recent
district court section 355 decision, held that the fact that a business
had no telephone or separate business address, conducted no advertising or even held itself out to third persons as a separate
business address or entity, though relevant, was not dispositive
of the active business test. The court approvingly quoted a non3o See Reg. §§ 1.954-2(d)(1)(ii)(b)(3)(i) and 1.954-~(d)(l)(ii) Ex. (4).
31 COHEN, CoRPO&ATE SEPA&ATIONS-ACTIVE BllSINESS REQUIRE!!E!:TS A-ll (B.N.A.
224 T.M. 1969).
32

W.E. Gabriel Fabrication

C~.,

42 T.C. 545, 556 (1964).

33 See, e.g., Reiner v. United States, 222 F.::!d 770 (7th Cir. 19::i::i); Gilford v.
Comm 'r, 201 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1953}; cf. Voss v. United States, 3!'!!1 F.!'!d 1M (7th
Cir. 1964); see generally Lee, "Active Conduct" Distinguislu:d From "Conduct" of

a Eental Eeal Estate Business, 25 TAX LAWYER 317, 321-2~ (1972).
34 Rafferty speaks of sale of both stock and nssets, but it is clear that the sto~l: bad
a readily realizable value because the assets were highly liquid.
35 See text accompanying notes 96-105 infra for an explanation of the court's general
approach.
3s 338 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mont. 1971).
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section 355 case which had concluded that a business without
employees may be conducted through agents.87
Consequently, the Tax Court's conclusion in King that the
subsidiaries performed these activities in name only is questionable.88 Indeed the Sixth Circuit in its reversal of the Tax Court
in King disagreed with the Tax Court's conclusion that the
subsidiaries performed the acquisition of property, financing, construction and expansion of the terminals in name only. The
appellate court believed this conclusion was based on the interdependence between the parent and subsidiaries and that the Tax
Court had disregarded the separate entities of the real estate
holding subsidiaries. The Sixth Circuit ruled that the Tax Court's
conclusion here was "violative of the principle that, especially
for tax purposes, separate corporations, even parent and wholly
owned subsidiary, must be treated as separate entities, no matter
how closely they may be affiliated. The separate corporate entity
may not be disregarded.'' 39
The "Entrepreneurial Activities" Test

Since these management activities were conducted by the subsidiaries in King, the question arises whether they constitute the
active conduct of a trade or business. This requires analysis of
the Rafferty "entrepreneurial activities" test-'' entrepreneurial
activities of .such a nature and to such an extent as to qualitatively
distinguish its operations from mere investments." Both King
and Rafferty involved rental of real estate and the usual, i.e., not
"active," trade or business test applied to such activities is regular and continuous management or rental activities. Such activi87 American Savings Bank, 56 T.C. 828, 839 (1971) (section 61 "sham" issue). Other
seetion 355 deeisions have held that cases deeided under Code provisions not containing
the qualification "active" are not authority upon tho question of whnt constitutl•s an
active business. E.g., E. Ward King, 55 T.C. 677, 700 (1971). Hanson appears on this
point more in agreement with Parshelsky's Estate v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1962), deeided under the 1939 Code predecessor to section 355, which hoM that tho
traditional trade or business cases are authority as to what constitutes an activo
business. Of. George Rothenberg, 48 T.C. 369, 373 (1967); Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (1).
ss Even if the subsidiaries were totally "inert" so that these activities wore attribut·
able to the parent, it could be argued that the parent was the true owner of the entire
real estate aspects of the enterprise during the five year period. Thus, it would have
actively conducted the acquisition, financing and leasing real estate business which it
transferred to the subsidiaries as they were spun off. But of. H.L. Morgenstern, 50
T.C. 44, 47 (1971). The only question (which is not answered by the record) would bo
whether the spun-off corporations were actively condueting a real cstato business nfter
the distribution.
s9 458 F.2d 247.
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ties generally involve more than investment and reinvestment
in real estate, they constitute the management of real estate itself
for profit. A distinction has been drawn by the Tax Court under
another active business provision between the active conduct of
rental business and the mere holding of property for investment
based, in effect, upon regular and continuous management and
rental activities.40 Similarly for the purposes of an exception to
the term "foreign personal holding company income" as used in
the subpart F provisions, rents are considered under section
1.95~2(d) (1) (ii) (a) (2) of the regulations to be derived in the active conduct of a trade or business if generated by leasing '' [r] eal
property with respect to which the lessor performs active and
substantial management and operational functions while the property is leased." This test is met where the owner of an office
building acts as rental agent for the leasing of the offices and
employs a substantial staff to perform other management and maintenance functions. 41
Thus Rafferty's new test approaches the usual trade or business test applied to rental real estate by tribunals other than the
Tax Court (which applies a more liberal test), and which has been
relied upon in other active business provisions.42 Rafferty may
therefore signal a trend towards uniformity in the context of
the section 355 active business concept not only as to other active
business provisions but also as to the usual trade or business
provisions-a goal advocated by some commentators. Significantly,
although the net leases involved in Rafferty or King would not
meet this test, the acquisition, financing and construction activities
present in King (and in Rafferty in the fifth year) would.43 The
40 For a discussion maintaining that the management activities test ns applied to
rental real estate distinguishes such activities from mere investments sec Lee, ".A.ctit:e
Conduct" Distinguished From "Conduct" of a Bental Ileal Estate Business, ::!5 T.u:
LA.WYE& 317, 323-24 (1972).
uReg. § 1.954-2(d)(1)(ii)(c) Ex. 5. However, these regulations state that examples
such as the one in text constitute ''specific cases in which rents • • • will be considered
for purposes of this subparagraph to be derived in the active conduct of a trnde or
business." Reg. § 1.954-2(d)(l)(i) (emphasis added). The import may be that these
definitional rules are considered by the Treasury to be of less than universal applicn·
tion to the term ''active conduct of a trade or business.'' If so, the question arises
as to the source of the authority to give the same phrase chnmeleon-U!.to quality in
different Code provisions. Moreover, the regulations disregard the activities of an
independent contractor, such as a real estate management firm (hence the example in
text notes that the owner acted as rental agent). Reg. § L954-2(d) (3) (i).
42 George Rothenberg, 48 T.C. 369, 373 (1967); Union Natioll!ll Bank v. United
States, 195 F. Supp. 382 (N.D.N.Y. 1961).
43 It should be noted that another basis for the decision reached in King that none
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Sixth Circuit's opinion in King is not entirely clear on this point.
Its primary emphasis was on the construction activities of the
terminal leasing subsidiaries but it also reiterated that they performed ''all activities necessary to the operation of the real
estate leasing business." Its response to the Tax Court's conclusion that income from net leases constituted pure passive income
without the concomitant expenditure of money or effort on the part
of the lessor was equally equivocal: (1) net leases represented
the most advantageous method of doing business, were bona fide
and of a customary type in the industry for a customary rent, and
(2) leasing was far from the only activity conducted by the
subsidiaries. The first response-apparently a modified business
purpose approach-is not responsive to whether net leasing activities without more constitute the active conduct of a trade or business; the second implies that the construction activities alone
or in conjunction with net leasing qualify as an active business.
Rafferty also requires objective indicia of the entrepreneurial
activities and held that the failure of the spun-off corporation to
pay salaries hardly constituted an indicium of corporate operations. In King, the Tax Court had noted that the spun-off corporations had only one employee for the first three years of the five
year predistribution period and thereafter none, concluding that
''objectively we find it quite difficult to perceive the active conduct
of a trade or business when no activities are being performed by
the corporations in question.'' The Sixth Circuit's answer to this
conclusion by the Tax Court was that each subsidiary had four
officers and at least four directors, who all rendered substantial
services in acting for them and that officers and directors customarily serve without compensation in the absence of special
provisions.
Since operating an apartment building would constitute an
active business under the entrepreneurial activities approach, any
implication that the section 355 active business test as applied to
rental real estate requires in addition to regular and continuous
management and rental services (furnishing of utilities, clearing
of public areas, collection of trash, et cetera) "significant" additional services, such as mail services, to be rendered to tenants, 44
that might have arisen from the comparison by the lower court in
of the real estate leasing corporations received rentals from outside parties, 55 T.O. 081
was expressly rejected in Rafferty, 452 F.2d at 772 nn.10 and 12.
44 E.g., Saunders, ''Trade or Business,'' Its Meaning uniler t11e Internal Bevonuo
Coile, 1960 S. Calif. Inst. 693, 744.
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Rafferty of the section 355 active business concept with the section 1372(e) (5) definition of "passive investment income," should
be dispelled.
Although the Treasury has frequently utilized the technique of
excluding "active business" type receipts from the definition of
"rents" only if the recipient renders "significant services," this
approach has not been universally applied. For example, sections 163(d)(3)(B) and 57(b)(2)(B) (the excess investment interest provisions) include rents in the term "investment income"
but only to the extent such income is not derived from the conduct
of a trade or business. The proposed regulations accompanying
section 57 appear to equate this exception with the active conduct
of a trade or business, but rely on the definition provided in the
regulations of "property held for investment"-a key term undefined in the statute-for substantive content.45 That term in
turn is patterned after the statutory definition of investment
income : Property held for production or collection of passive income, such as rent, unless such income is "derived from properties actively used in the conduct of a trade or business.'' 40 An
earlier version of this exception followed the more traditional
terminology of income derived from the active conduct of trade
or business.47
This "actively used" exception clearly would not require the
lessor to render significant additional services to the tenant since
the proposed investment interest regulations further provide that
property is not held for investment if expenses in connection with
it are deductible under section 162,48 one of the provisions under
which the real estate rental business test of regular and continuous management and rental activities developed and which
does not demand rendition of such significant additional services.
Similarly, judicial interpretation of the phrase ''actively carrying
on a trade or business" used in section 1.761-1(a) (1) of the regulations has rested on case law development under section 162.''0 And
just as the subpart F regulations offer rental of offices in an office
building as an example of an active business, section 1.761-l(a) (1)
illustrates actively carrying on a trade or business with the example of co-owners of an apartment building leasing space and
45 Prop.

Reg. § 1.57-2(b)(4), 36 Fed. Reg. 12024 (1971); of. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)·

(vi).

Prop. Reg. § 1.57-2(b) (2) (i), 36 Fed. Reg. 12023 (1971).
Prop. Reg. § 1.57-2(b)(2), 35 Fed. Reg. 19767 (1970).
4BProp. Reg. § 1.57-2(b)(2)(i), 36 Fed. Reg. 12023 (1971).
49 George R{)thenberg, 48 T.C. 369, 373 (1967).
46

47
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providing services to the occupants directly or through an agent. 50
On the other hand, payments for use or occupancy of apartments
or offices are generally treated as passive ''rents'' under the subchapter S regulations.51
In summary, the adoption with respect to other provisions dealing with active business or passive income of management and
rental activities as an alternative to the restrictive significant
additional services approach of the subchapter S regulations
militates against reliance on the latter provision to determine
whether the section 355 active business test is met in the context
of a rental real estate business.
Current Production of Income

The Rafferty court's promulgation of the entrepreneurial activities test and rejection of the requirement of independent production of income do not directly answer the question of whether a
prerequisite of actively conducting a business is current production of income. Andrew M. 8pheeris,52 decided by the Tax Court
shortly before it handed down Rafferty and King, puts this issue
in perspective. There a corporation was actively conducting a business of operating and leasing several commercial rental properties when fire gutted an office building located on one of the
properties. Due to conflict among its shareholders as to whether
to reconstruct the existing building or to undertake new improvements on a larger scale under a proposed city redevelopment
project, the vacant building and its lot were placed in a new
corporation (Anmarcon) which was then split off with two shareholders in the parent exchanging all their stock in the old corporation for all of the stock in the new corporation. Anmarcon 's shareholders continued extensive activities and negotiations towards
erecting an appropriate structure on the land and returning it to
income producing status. Approximately a year later, the city
abandoned the redevelopment project and after further negotiations to :finance large scale improvements, Anmarcon transferred
the property in a like-kind exchange.
The Service agreed that the division met all the requirements of
section 355, with one exception-the postdistribution active business requirement. The Tax Court found that due to the nativities
to restore the property to income producing status the property
Reg. § 1.954-2(d)(1)(ii) (c) Ex. 5.
Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (5) (vi).
52 54 T.C. 1353 (1970), aff'd, 461 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1972).

50

51
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was not held by Anmarcon for investment purposes. Therefore,
the split-off did not result in the separation of the old corporation's business and investment assets. But the court further
announced that "Section 355 (b) requires not only that the assets
involved in a corporate separation be business assets, but that
the assets so separated, together with the activities in connection
therewith, constitute operating businesses immediately after such
separation.'' 53 It found that the activities in themselves would
not result in income or profit since the improvement projects
would have required the acquisition of additional land and were
contingent upon the city's plans for redevelopment.
Thus, the Tax Court in Spheer-i.s decided that active business
status was precluded by the proviso of the regulations that "a
trade or business consists of a specific group of activities being
carried on for the purpose of earning income or profit.'' M To the
extent the opinion rests on the independent production of income
doctrine-the activities would not in themselves result in income or
profit-it obviously conflicts with the Rafferty rejection of that doctrine. The Seventh Circuit has recently affirmed Spheeris, agreeing
with the Tax Court "that holding a fire-damaged, non-incomeproducing property did not constitute the active conduct of a trade
or business.'' 55 In stark contrast with this conclusion is section
1.382(a)-l(h) (6) of the regulations and its accompanying Example 2 which reveal that the Treasury has on occasion committed itself to the position that a temporary suspension of a corporation's
normal activities (such as manufacturing) due to a fire does not
of itself constitute a failure to carry on an active trade or business.
Although the corporation in the example engaged in substantial
efforts to reactivate its business by reconstructing the damaged
plant, there is no indication that it was producing income.
The Tax Court's limitation of active business status to operating businesses was based on legislative history accompanying the
1954 House proposals, which the court erroneously assumed were
substantially similar to the Senate active business provision.~;o
In fact, the underlying theory of the House corporate division
ss 54 T.C. at 1362.
54 Reg. § 1.355-1(e).
55 Spheeris v. Comm 'r, 461 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1972).
ss Andrew M. Spheeris, 54 T.C. 1353, 1362 n. 4 (1970). te Subsection (c) of section
353 defines the term 'inactive corporation' •••• [T]he transfer to newly created
subsidiary of a portion of its [the distributing corporation] business and tbe distribu·
tion of such stock . • • to the shareholders will not qualify • • • unless such assets
constitute an operating business." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., ::!d Sess. Al23-::!4
(1954). (Emphasis added).
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section was completely rejected by the Senate: ''Under the House
bill, it is immaterial whether the assets are those used in an
active business . . . . Your committee returns to existing law in
not permiting the tax free separation of an existing corporation
into active and inactive entities." 57
It is somewhat surprising that the Tax Court held that though
the assets were active,t;s the corporation, in effect, was not: It
seems unlikely that the Coady rationale contemplated the application of different criteria to determine whether assets or the corporate entity were active or inactive. Furthermore, since Anmar·
con's development activities manifested that it did not hold the
property for investment purposes, those same activities meet the
Rafferty active business test-distinguishing the corporate operations from mere investments.59 Moreover, an operating business is
not a reliable test: The spun-off corporation in Rafferty although
an operating business was ''in economic terms, almost indistinguishable from an investment in securities.''
The Tax Court, however, also observed that the activities of
Anmarcon ''were, at most, no more than preliminary to actually
51 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Seas. 5D-51 (1954); see also W.E. Gabriel
Fabrication Co., 42 T.C. 545, 555 (1964). The House bill was intended to chango tho
existing law and make it immaterial whether assets were used in an activo business or
were investment assets. Under the House Bill if stock of an ''inactive corporation,'' one
with more than 10 per cent of personal holding company income, was disposed of
within ten years of a corporate division, the proceeds would be tn.xed as ordinary
income. A "good" corporation had 90 per cent of its income generated by "assets
constituting an operating business" or by "operating assets." Spheeris was not tho
first court to misread the legislative history in this area. See Pnrshelsky 's Estate v.
Co='r, 303 F.2d 14, 17-18, n.14 (2d Cir. 1962).
58 "In the instant case, after the building situated en the Wells Stroot property was
destroyed by fire [the taxpayer] engaged in numerous activities, first on behalf
of the company and then on behalf of Anmarcon, which were directed toward ulti·
mately returning the property to an income-producing status. We do not, therefore
think that the Wells Street property was abandoned as a business asset by tho company
prior to [the time when] such property was transferred to Anmarcon, nor do wo
think the record supports the view that the property was thereafter held by Anmarcon
for investment purposes. It seems clear, therefore, that the transfer of the Wells
Street property to Anmarcon and tho distribution of Anmarcon 's stock to [tho
taxpayer] did not result in the separation of a corporation's business and investment
assets." 54 T.C. at 1361.
59 Active development and management and maintenance of rental properties removes
a corporation from "mere holding or investment company status" under section 533
where "mere" distinguishes between holding or investment corporations that arc
strictly passive in nature and those that engage in some measure of business activity,
Dahlem Foundation, Inc., 54 T.C. 1566, 1576-78 (1970). The implication is, however,
that such activities (which were more extensive than the development activities in
Spheeris) would not remove a corporation from classification ns an investment company.
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engaging in a business.'' 60 Under the ''preopening'' expense
cases, the rule is seemingly well established that to the extent n
business has not begun to function as a going concern and to
perform those activities for which it was organized it is not engaged in carrying on any trade or business within the meaning
of section 162(a).61 The Seventh Circuit in sustaining the Commissioner's and the Tax Court's position in Spheer-is relied in
major part on this approach-in its view Anmarcon through its
sole stockholder was engaging in a search for ventures which
would be new and more profitable than the old rental business
which, the court concluded, had been discontinued. These activities
were categorized as investigative and promotional in nature.02
Just as any nonproduction of income basis for the Sp1zeeris
conclusion is weak, the rationale that the split-off corporation was
not actively conducting a business because it was merely investigating a new business is subject to criticism. The pre-operating or investigatory expense rule does not apply where the investigated opportunity is related to a previously existing business, i.e.,
investigatory expenses are not per se capital, rather they must be
related to an existing business. 03 Thus, the Fourth Circuit, in York
ao 54 T.C. at 1363.
61See Richmond Television C-orp. v. United Stnte3, 345 F.2d 901, 905-07 (4th Clr.),
'IJacatea ana remandea per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. OS (1905). The lD.rgest
body of authority on "preparatory expenses" is to be found in the area of farming
expenses, see, e.g., Maple v. Co='r, 440 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1971); Wonell v.
United States, 254 F. Supp. 9921 996 (S.D. Tex. 1906) ; Edwin H. Miner, 21 T.C.'M.
1173, 1176 (1967). Despite the Service's heavy reliance on Bic7mJond Tclt:t:ision in that
area there is some question as to whether co=encement of commercinl enterprises
and of farming operations are true analogues.
The rationale of the preopening expense concopt is subject to strong criticism. The
argument that capitalization is required because sueh expenditures increase tht:> t:>arning
capacity of a bnsiness, Mid-Stnte Prods. Co., 21 T.C. 690, 714 (1954), is contradicted
by the fact that similar expenditures to expand an existing businc83 aro currently
deductible. See York v. Comm'r, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958). The other rationnlt:>,
espoused in JUchmond Television, that a preopening enterprise is not engnging in
a trade or bnsiness conflicts with the Service's position in other areas, e.g., Reg. § 1.::!481(a) (1), Rev. Rul 72-220, 1972-18 I.R.B. 16, and earlier case law, e.g., 379 ~fadi.!lon
Ave., Inc. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1932).
62 "Investigative" eonnotes a preoperating expense, see Mort~n Franlt, ::!0 T.C. 511,
513 (1933); "promotional" on the other hand connotes the Higgins-W71ipplo nonbusiness expense or investment aetivities development. Inve3tigntion by itself is not,
in the eyes of the Service, a section 355 trade or business. Sec Rev. Rul. 57-412,
1957-2 C.B. 247; Fleischer, The To:.c Treatment of Expenses Incurred in Int:estigat{on
For a Business or Capital Investment, 14 TAX L. REV. 507, 508 n.10 (1959). However,
the Higgins trend is properly limited to the distinction between activities of n
shareholder and his corporation. Promotional activities by n. corporation would Ecem
the essence of the entrepreneurial process, the npproaeh taken in Baflt:rty.
63 It is possible that the expense need only be related to a. future business, rotht:'r
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v. Commissioner, 64 reversed the Tax Court's position that expenditures by a residential and commercial real estate developer to
determine the potential of a tract of land for industrial development were nondeductible exploratory expenditures to determine
whether to venture into a new line of business on the grounds that
the activity was still intramural, not a new pursuit, apart from his
general occupation. Similarly, the recent employment agency fee
cases in the Tax Court indicate that investigative activities are
deductible if made in the same general type of business in which
the taxpayer has been engaging.6li
Since section 355 (b) contemplates the possibility of continuance
of the same predisposition business across corporate lines, a newly
created spun-off corporation should retain the status of the predisposition business conducted by the distributing corporation in the
same manner as if it had conducted the business for the purpose
of determining whether the new corporation is merely preparing
to engage in a new business or is attempting to expand from an
existing predisposition business into a related and, hence, not new
pursuit. Following this approach it would not matter that the
prior real estate activities were ''discontinued' 1 since trade or
business status does not cease to exist during a reasonable period
of transition. An illustration is the taxpayer in Harold Haft 66
than an existing business. See Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932, 935 (1969); c1ccord,
David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 380-81 (1970) (alternative holding).
64 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958).
6G David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 378, 381-82 (1970) (nlternative holding and con·
curring opinion); cf., Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C. No. 20 (1972). The Seventh Clr·
cuit did not directly answer the taxpayer's argument that the corporation continued to
engage in the same type of business.
66 40 T.C. 1, 6 (1963); cf. Penton v. United States, 259 F.2d 536, 539 (6th Cir.
1958) (continuity of business not destroyed by temporary cessation of business activi·
ties; no discontinuance of operation of business regularly carried on); United States
v. Hercules Mining Co., 119 F.2d 288, 291 (9th Cir. 19U), cert. clenied, 314 U.S.
658 (1941) (despite temporary cessation of milling business corporation doing business
for capital stock ta."i: under section 701(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934).
Similarly, the regulations under section 382(a), apparently reflecting the Penton
pre-1954 net operating loss deduction trend, provide that a corporation has not
continued to carry on a trade or business substantially the same as that conducted
prior to a change of ownership if it is "not carrying on an active trade or business
at the time" of such change. Reg. § 1.382(a)-1 (h) (6); accord, S.F.H., Inc., 53 T.O.
28, 33 (1969), aff'd, 444 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1971). As an illustration, they further
conclude that a temporary suspension of a. corporation's normal activities due to
involuntary abnormal circumstances, such as a fire, does not of itself constitute a
failure to carry on substantially the same (active) trade or business. Reg. § 1.382(a)1 (h)(6) Ex. 2; accord, Glover Packing Co. v. United States, 328 F.2d 3<!21 348 (ct.
Cl. 1964). The corporation in the above example suspended ito manufacturing activi·
ties due to a fire and thereafter made substantial efforts to reactivate its business
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who did not cease to be in the costume jewelry business simply
because he was temporarily unemployed and had no merchandise
to sell. There the taxpayer was actively seeking a suitable connection commensurate with his status in the costume jewelry field,
and the court found the transition period (over four years) a
reasonable one. In Sphee1·is the nexus between Anmarcon 's real
estate development activities, implicitly active in the eyes of the
Tax Court, and the predisposition rental real estate business was
such that they were incurred in a trade or business and not preliminary to actually engaging in a business.
Even if Anmarcon 's development activities related only to a
new business, under the organizational expenditures provision
a corporation is deemed to have begun business (the starting point
for a 60 month amortization period) when its activities have
advanced to the extent necessary to establish the nature of the
business.67 Certainly Anmarcon's acquisition of property suitable
only for rental, in one form or another, established that it was in
the rental real estate business. Third, the pre-operating expense
trend has on occasion been utilized in applying a ''going trade or
business" test,68 which appears closely analogous to the House's
proposed ''operating business'' concept discarded by the Senate
in favor of the active business test.
Beyond the preoperating business question, it is clear that a
corporation operating as a going concern may be engaged in a
trade or business without producing current profit or income.69
Thus, it may be concluded that at least where a corporation is
engaged in a trade or business under the traditional tests and
also meets the active business activities and objecth·e criteria
tests of Rafferty, it should qualify as an active business despite
the fact that it may not be currently generating profit or income.
An example would be if a corporation like Anmarcon had immediately begun reconstruction or expansion of improvements upon
by reconstructing the damaged plant-a factual pattern closely analogous to that in
Spheeris. Thus, the split-off corporation in Splu:eris was arguably conduding nn active
business under this approach.
67 Reg. § 1.248-1(a).
68 See John F. Koons, 35 T.C. 10921 1099 (1961).
69 See Stephens, Inc. v. United States, 464 F.2d 53, 6-1-65 (8th Cir. 1972). It may
be noted that although the Rafferty court approved functional di\'isions muler section
355, the Tax Court has held that in a highly integrated enterpriEe comlueted through
multiple corporations, the management entity earns the entire income of the enterprise.
Mare's Big Boy Prospect, Inc., 52 T.C. 1073 (1969), aff'd, 452 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1971 ).
But see Your Host, Ine., 58 T.C. No. 2 (1972). Thus, spun-off noumnuagement functions
would be actively eondueting a business without produeing income.
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being spun off but was unable to lease to commercial tenants
until a year or so later. A further variant of this problem is
whether active conduct of a business requires profit as well as
production of income: an example would be a used car business
that only breaks even, but is nevertheless necessary to dispose of
used cars acquired in a new car business.70 In summation, to the
extent the provisions of the regulations approved in Spheeris
require a group of activities to be carried on fol' the purpose of
earning current income or profit to qualify as a business under
section 355 they are not in all instances a reasonable interpretation
of the statute.71
AcTIVE BusiNEss REGULATIONS AFTER Rafferty
At this point a recapitulation of the current status of the active
business regulations is in order. The starting point is that despite
their heading, ''active business,'' they do not profess to define
an active trade or business, rather they state that ''without regard
to such rules (specific active conduct of a trade or business rules),
for purposes of section 355, a trade or business consists of a
specific existing group of activities," meeting the requirements
set forth in the regulations. 72 When these requirements are compared with the development of the term ''trade or business,'' as
usually used in the Code, they lose much of their efficacy.
It seems the Treasury believes the term ''trade or business'' is
quite malleable, having contradictory meanings when desired. For
example, the Treasury has indicated that the standard meaning
of the term "is not limited to integrated aggregates of assets,
activities and good will which comprise businesses for the purposes
of certain other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.'' 78 This
definition clearly conflicts with the definition of tmde or business
provided in the regulations under section 355. Of course, use by
one section of terms also used in another section calls for practical and sensible interpretation in fitting the adopted terms
into the adopting statute.74 Here the only guidance as to any spe1o See Hanson v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mont. 1971) (court assumed
arguendo that predistribution used car business constituted active business, but noh•d
absence of profit; such business was not continued after distribution).
71 Corum 'r v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 406, 501 (1948) (regulnUona thnt
are reasonable and consistent interpretations of statutory provisions must bo sustained).
12 Reg. § 1.355-1 (c).
73 Reg. § 1.513-1(b). The term "trade or business" in this definition has tho sumo
meaning as in section 162.
74 WarrPn R. Miller, Sr., 51 T.C. 755, 761 (1968).
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cial meaning to be assigned to the term "trade or business" is the
function of the active conduct of a trade or business requirement :
"to prevent the tax free separation of actire and inactire assets
into active and inactive corporate entities." ;:; Measured against
this purpose, the regulations defining "active" business or trade
or business for purposes of section 355 by and large do not constitute a reasonable interpretation of the statute nor do they
reflect congressional intent.
Their requirement of independent production of income was
expressly rejected by the First Circuit in Rafferty-a result
concurred in by the Sixth Circuit in King. Similarly, the exclusion
from trade or business status of the operation of owner-occupied
real estate is implicitly rejected. The "incidental activity" concept-an activity incidental to the principal business or an incidental use of property used primarily in the principal business does
not constitute a trade or business 70-is contained in the same
proviso of the regulations as the erroneous independent production of income doctrine and appears to reflect the two business
requirements rejected by Coady. Furthermore, its probable
broader basis, the theory that an active business must include
every step in the process of earning income, is implicitly rejected
by Rafferty in its conclusion that the Coady rationale applies to
a functional division. As one commentator has pointed out, spunoff assets that comprise merely a single step or an incidental, as
well as an integral, function in the total enterprise should qualify
under the active business requirement ''if they reflect a substantial level of business activity." 77 Broad readings of the requirement of activities being carried on for the purpose of earning
income or profit from only such activities, though not directly
questioned by Rafferty, are incompatible with its reasoning.78 In
short, the only provision of the active business regulations untouched directly or indirectly by the First Circuit's opinion is
the exclusion from trade or business status of the J10lding for
investment purposes of stock, securities, land or other property.
75 Edmund P. Coady, 33 T.C. 771, 777 (1960), a[f'd per curiam, !'!89 F.!'!d 490 (Gth
Cir. 1961).
16 Isabel A. Elliot, 32 T.C. 283, 280-90 (1959); accord, Theodore F. Appleby, a:;
T.C. 755, 763 (1961), aff'd, 296 F.2d 925 (3d Cir.), ccrt. denied, 370 U.S. 910 (1DG2).
11

BITTKER & EusTICE, FEDERAL IncoME T.t.X.\TION OF C-onFun.\TI•ms .um

Su.uu:.

13-15-13-16 (3d ed. 1971).
1s Bonsall and Appleby, which appear inconsistent wilb tl1e Rafferty sanction of a
functional division of owner·occupied real estate, rest in part on the regulation 'a re·
quirement of inclusion of every operation which forms a stt:p in the process of earning
income.
HOLDERS
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Although the appellate court in Rafferty liberalized the active
business test, it did so with the express design of utilizing instead
the device test where a distribution possesses considerable potential for a bail-out of earnings and profi.ts.79 Accordingly, where a
vertically integrated business is separated, and particularly, if
real estate primarily used in the enterprise is separated, the
focus may be expected to shift from the active business test, which
heretofore has been the most troublesome requirement of section
355, to the device test.
Device Test
GENERAL

As a prerequisite to a tax-free corporate separation under section 355 the Code also requires that the division not be used
''principally as a device for the distribution of the earnings and
profits of the distributing corporation or the controlled corporation or both.'' 80 The regulations under the device clause speak
to four areas: (1) sale of the spun-off stock, (2) continuity of
interest, (3) proportion of liquid assets of both corporations, and
(4) relationship of the device test to the active business requirements.81 They consider post distribution sales that are not pursuant
to an arrangement agreed upon prior to the distribution as well as
prearranged sales as evidence that the transaction was used principally as a device. 82 This focus of the regulations on post disti·ibution sales is reinforced by their incorporation of the continuity of
79 "We prefer this approach [i.e., device test, requiring taxpayer showing of busi·
ness purpose germane to continuance of corporate business whore transaction has
considerable bail-out potential] over reliance upon formulations such as 'business pur·
pose', and 1 active business.' " Rafferty v. Comm 'r, 452 F.2d 767, 770 (1st Cir. 1971).
80 I.R.C. § 355(a) (1) (B).
s1 Reg. § 1.355-2(b).
82 Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (1). Lest the Service take the view that every spin off followed
by a sale violated the device provision, Congress added a parontlJCtical to tho device
clause: "(but the mere fact that subsequent to the distribution stock or securities
in one or more of such corporations are sold or exchanged (other U1an pursuant to an
arrangement negotiated or agreed upon prior to such distribution) shall not be con·
strued to mean that the transaction was used principally as such a device)." Sco
COHEN, CORPORATE SEPARATIONS-GENERAL REQUIREMENTS A-13 (B.N.A. 233 T.M. 1969).
Somewhat surprisingly, the regulations interpret this to mean that a nonprearrangod
sale is also evidence of a device, but not determinative. Apparently in 11 this ratl10r
subtle way" a greater onus was intended to be placed on prearrangetl sales. Id. at .A-1•!
n.38. However, the prearranged sale exception in the statute bas also been interpreted
as permitting prearrangements to be construed as showing a device, but not requiring
that conclusion. Mary Archer W. Morris Trust, 42 T.C. 779, 790 (1964), atf'd, 307
F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).
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interest doctrine 83 : ''Section 355 contemplates a continuity of the
entire business enterprise under modified corporate forms and a
continuity of interest in all or part of such business enterprise on
the part of those persons who, directly or indirectly, were the owners of the enterprise prior to the distribution or exchange .... '' 84
The other principal focus of the device regulations is on the proportion of active business assets held by the postdistribution
corporation. For example, in application of a facts and circumstances approach to determine if a transaction was used
principally as a device,
consideration will be given to the nature, k-ind and amount of the assets
of both corporations . . . immediately after the transaction. The fact
that at the time of the transaction substantially all of the assets of each
of the corporations involved are and have been used in the active
conduct of trades or businesses . . . will be considered evidence that
the transaction was not used principally as such a device.s:~

Thus, a distribution may constitute a device because of bail-out
potential even though the distributee does not sell the stock or
securities. For these regulations emphasize that in determining
whether a distribution is a device, the percentage of active business assets held by the controlled and distributing corporations
will be taken into account.86 It would appear that if only a small
percentage of either corporation's assets are business assets, a
rebuttable inference is created that the transaction is a device.
Indeed, one commentator has suggested that the nonbusiness
assets should constitute less than half of both corporations' assets
if such device inference is to be overcome.87 Similar unofficial rules
of thumb were originally set up by the Service. under the active
business test: At least half of the assets to be separated bad (1) to
83 The classic continuity of interest doctrine requires both a continuity of the business enterprise under a modified corporate form and a continuity of interest tberein
on the part of those persons who were the owners of enterprise prior to the transaction.
Reg. § 1.368-1(b). This doctrine, however, conflicts witb tl1e statute itself: (1) n
non pro rata division (such as a split up with two 50 per cent shareholders each receiving a 100 per cent interest in one of the postdistribuUon corporations), expressly
authorized by section 355(a) {2) (A), violates the classic continuity of interest doctrine
since tbere is only a 50 per cent shareholder enrryo\·cr into the resulting corporations;
and (2) a postdistribution, but not prearranged sale, which in some instances is
sanctioned by tbe parenthetical contained in section 355(n) {1) (B), would also break
continuity.
84 Reg. § 1.355-2(e).
8s Reg. § 1.355-2{b){3).
86 Cohen, Partial Liquidations and Spin·Of!s of Real Estate Corporations, 21 N.Y.U.
!NST. 685, 709 (1963).
87 Jacobs, The Anatomy of a Spin-Of!, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1, 10.
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be five years old, (2) to constitute more than half of the fair
market value of the new corporation, and (3) to be projected to
produce more than half of the future income. 88 These tests have
fallen into disrepute under the active business test. It may be
noted that in their suggested reincarnation under the device test,
five year aging for business assets is not thought necessary. The
above outline of the device regulations manifests that the Service
sees the relationship between the device and active business tests
as being very limited: If substantially all the assets of both corporations are used in active business, an inference arises that the
spin-off was not used principally as a device. Indeed, one commentator maintains that the essential weakness of the active business concept as fashioned by the current regulations is that whether
the transaction satis:fies the active business rules llas very little
effect on the determination of whether the transaction constitutes
a device. 89
The device restriction, however, is not the only anti-bail-out
defense relied upon by the Service in addition to the active
business requirement. Under regulations entitled, ''Business purpose,'' the Treasury has taken the position that transactions will
not qualify under section 355 :
where carried out for purposes not germane to the business of the
corporations. The principal reason for this requirement is to limit the
application of section 355 to certain specified distributions or exchnng('s
... incident to such readjustment of corporate structures as is required
by business exigencies and which, in general, effect only a readjustment
of continuing interests in property under modified corporate forms ....
All the requisites of business and corporate purposes described under
§ 1.368 must be met to exempt a transaction from the recognition of gain
or loss under this section.90

Although the device test is itself descended from Gregory v.
Helvering,0 1 in which it was linked with the business purpose
doctrine, the Commissioner has argued that the business purpose
doctrine exists independently of the device clause. The Ninth
Circuit has accepted this argument, denying the benefits of section
355 to a transaction that the Tax Court found complied with all
the literal requirements of the statute including the device clause,
88 See Caplin, Corporate Division Under the 1954 Code: A New Approach to tl10
Five-Year "Active Business" Rule, 43 VA. L. REV. 387, 403-0•1 (1957).
89 Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to Corporate Separations
Under tlle 1954 Code, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1194, 1256 n.292 (1968).
90 Reg. § 1.355-2 (c).
91

293

u.s.

469 (1935).
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but which the appellate court concluded had no business reason.0~
This doctrine has many ramifications. For example, the Service
argues that a distinction should be drawn between corporate and
shareholder purposes. However, the courts have refused by and
large to make this distinction; the new tack that the Rafferty
court has taken in this area is discussed below. In addition, such
a purpose has been required for the distribution of stock and
securities in the spun-off corporation as well as for the initial
separation of the assets into subsidiary status.03 The former
business purpose is thought to be most troublesome in spin-offs
and other pro rata transactions.
One commentator surveying such extra statutory judicial doctrines as the business purpose doctrine and continuity of interest
and the reliance placed on them in comparison with the restricted
view of the device clause displayed by the Service (as in Revenue
Ruling 64-102 94 in which the Treasury indicated that it viewed
the device requirement as a dividend equivalency test) has concluded that rather than reading the device pro,•ision broadly,
the Service has chosen to rely on the familiar reorganization
judicial doctrines. 95 Here, too, Rafferty charts a new course.
Rafferty:

DEVICE AND BAIL-OuT PoTENTIAL

In Rafferty the government's alternative position in the Ta.'"\:
Court had been that the taxpayer had not shown a valid corporate
business purpose for incorporating the business premises of the
controlling corporation and subsequently distributin~ th£' stoek in
the real estate subsidiary. The Tax Court accepted tltC' taxpayer's
contention that restructuring his stockholdings to facilitate estate
planning and to avoid possible future interfamily conflict that
might interfere with the operations of the controlling corporation
CQmm 'r v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965).
Estate of Parshelsky v. CQmm 'r, 303 F.2d 14, ~0 (2d Cir. 196~).
941964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 136. See also Rev. Rul. 71-383, 19il-::l C'.B. Hlll; Re\·. Rul.
71-384, 1971-2 C.B. 181. This stress on dividend equivnlenl'y-if till' tr.msal'tion absent section 355 would gh·e rise to capital gain or loss, ratbl'r tbnn dh·itlcnd incomC',
it does not constitute a device-is likely to be confined to split·U]lS and !:iplit·ofis that
are non pro rata in character under section 302(b)(::l). Altlwugb this apl'ruaelt lm<J
been criticized as an abdication of power by the Service, sec Wbitman, Dramin9 t1u•
Serbonian Bog: .A New .Approach to Corporate Separations Under t11c 195J Cotlc, 81
HARv. L. REV. 1194, 1237 (1968), to the e.·dent thnt such bx lore from the !lh·idt:nd
equivalency area as the "strict net effect" test is thereby importetl, the sam.- qul':>tions
will be raised as under the bail-out potentiality npproacl1 adopted in Raffcrtu, at least
where the distribution is non pro rata.
s~ Whitman, Draining tlle Serbonian Bog: ..4. New ..4.pproac1l to Corporate Scparationa
Under tlie 1954 Code, 81 HARv. L. REV. 11941 1239 (1968).
92

93
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constituted an adequate business purpose for the separation and
distribution of the subsidiary's stock.96 As to the corporate pur~
pose versus shareholder purpose distinction urged by the Service,
the Tax Court thought it unrealistic to distinguish between them
in the case before it but acknowledged that it would draw a dis~
tinction in cases where the shareholder purpose was incom~
patible with the business purpose requirements of section 355. 97
The appellate court agreed that a shareholder purpose could in
some instances save a transaction from condemnation as a device.
However, it viewed the correct rule to be that ''a distribution
which has considerable potential for use as a device for distribut~
ing earnings and profits should not qualify for tax free treatment
on the basis of personal motives unless those motives are germane
to the continuance of the corporate business.'' 98 Stated another
way, if in other respects the transaction was a device, the per~
sonal shareholder purpose in Rafferty could not satisfy the
taxpayer's burden of proving that the transaction was not being
used principally as a device. The court preferred this approach
to reliance upon such formulations as business purpose and active
business.
Thus, Rafferty reversed the trend favored by the Service of
emphasis on the active business requirement and judicial doc~
trines instead of the device restriction to combat potential bail~
outs. Such reversal of tactics had been advocated by Whitman, 99
a commentator upon whom the circuit relied in supporting its
approach. Whitman had objected to the predominant role assigned to the active business requirement on the grounds that it
channeled analysis into a definitional approach-whether a business was active rather than transactional, whether the particular
oe The plan incorporated two objectives: (1) exclusions of daughters (taxpayer l1ad
four daughters and five sons) and future sons-in-law from activo management of tho
principal (steel) business and (2) providing the daughters with investment assets
that produced a steady income, as opposed to the violently 1luctunting income of tho
steel business. 54 T.C. 490, 493-94, 496 (1970).
97 [T)here are certain instances where a distinction between a corporate purpose and
a shareholder purpose must be recognized, i.e., where a distribution is effected solely
for the purpose of enabling a shareholder to 1 milk' the parent corporation; whore
a distribution is effected for the purpose of meeting the personal obligations of tho
shareholders of the parent corporation and where a distribution is offrctod solely
for the purpose of reducing accumulated earnings and profits of tho parent corpora·
tion which have been permitted to accumulate beyond its reasonable needs.
54 T.C. at 497.
98 452 F.2d 767, 770 (1st Cir. 1971).
99 Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog: ..4. New Approach to Corporate Separations
Under the 1954 Code, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1194, 1245, 1252-53 (1968).
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separation should be allowed tax-free treatment.100 Similarly,
it was thought that a business purpose focus would lead to an
abstract, almost definitional approach. A strengthened device test
was proposed under which the taxpayer would have the burden
of proving lack of device-until recently the Service had, in
effect, assumed that burden. In essence the taxpayer would have
to show that he was entitled to tax deferral as to his corporate
separation. Suggested factors to be considered included business
reasons, absence of a postdistribution sale, lack of dividend equivalency, and likelihood of bail-out. In short, most of the factors
traditionally utilized by the Service and courts would still be
available, but particular factors would no longer be crystalized
as conclusive. The active business test would be quite restricted,
but the thrust of the present device regulations as to the proportion of active business assets strengthened-the more liquid the
assets of a postdistribution corporation were, the more likely
that the transaction would constitute a device, even if there were
good business reasons for the division.
The Rafferty court followed Whitman's overall proposed approach in broad outline. Its starting point was that the ta.\.-payer
has the burden of proving that the transaction was not used
principally as a device.101 There was a strong indication that business purpose is relevant only with respect to the issue of whether
the taxpayer has shown that the transaction is not a device and
has no independent significance. The active business test was
perforce downgraded in importance with the repudiation of virtually all the provisos of the active business regulations. However, the most significant step taken by Rafferty was adoption of
a transactional approach: whether the substance of the transaction
was to leave the taxpayer in a position to distribute the earnings
and profits of the corporation away from or out of the business
without impairing his equity interest in the corporation. The
content of this focus on bail-out potential in turn owes much to
the analysis of Bittker and Eustice, the leading commentators
in this area.102
100

za. at 1211, 1215-16, 1256-57.

The cireuit eourt relied for this purpose upon a decision (Marne S. Wilson, 42
T.C. 914 (1964), rev'a on other grounils, 353 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1965)) thnt bns been
deseribed as offering a promise of a new use for device-'' n. trnnsnetionnl tl?St with
elements eonsidered as faetors not terms"-nnd which nllocated the burden of proving
nondeviee to the taxpayer. 81 HARv. L. REV. at 1245, 1244.
101

102 BITTKE& &

HOLDERS

EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION Oi' C<lRPOilATIONS A!:D SIIAim·

13-28 (3d ed. 1971).
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DEVICE APPROACH

The court measured bail-out potentiality by two factors. The
first was the well established factor of readily realizable value
or proportion of liquid assets. The second was more directly
responsive to the underlying theory of a bail-out: whether sale
of the spun-off assets would adversely affect the shareholders of
the ongoing corporation. The First Circuit pointed out that a
spun-off corporation could be actively conducting a business, but,
if it was based principally on highly liquid investment type
assets, it would still have readily realizable value. The significance
of whether a sale would impair control over the ongoing business
lay in the conclusion that if it would, then the likelihood of bail-out
was slight. "If sale would adversely affect the shareholders of the
on-going company, the assets cannot be said to be sufficiently
separated from the corporate solution and the gain sufficiently
crystallized to be taxable.'' 103 In the case before it, the court
determined that the land and buildings held by the spun-off
corporation and in which the distributing corporation carried
on its steel operations were not so distinctive that the sale of
the spun-off corporation would impair the continued operation
of the distributing corporation or that such sale would in any
other way impair the taxpayer's control and other equity interests
in the distributing corporation. The court noted that this determination was reinforced by the fact that the distributing corporation was guaranteed occupancy of the property under a long-term
lease at fixed rents.
At first blush, this factor would appear irrelevant to determining whether a bail-out exists since the spun-off corporation is taxed
at ordinary income rates on the amounts received in the intercompany transactions. 104 Closer analysis reveals the bail-out potential.
The goal of any bail-out is to circumvent the double taxation
inherent in dividend distributions-one tax at the corporate
level on the profits of the venture and a second tax at the shareholder level on the distribution of such profits to the shareholders.
In a Rafferty type arrangement, in effect, only the lessor corporation pays a corporate tax on the portion of the profits
of the ongoing steel venture that are paid for rent since the lessee
deducts such "rent." 105 If after accumulation of such "rent"
452 F.2d 767, 771 (1st Cir. 1971).
§ 61(a)(5).
105 See BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SIIAUF!•
HOLDERS 13-15 (3d ed. 1971) (implication that siphoning off futuro earnings mn.y
constitute a bail-out arrangement).
10s

1041.R.C.

0
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profits the spun-off corporation is disposed of at capital gain
rates, arguably a bail-out has occurred at least as to the accumulated rental income. .Although provisions such as section 482 can
police this area by reaching excessive rental payments/00 a fair
market value rental charge would appear immune from attack 107
unless the spun-off corporation is a sham or the entire enterprise
is considered a single integrated enterprise and the Service successfully applies the "generation of income doctrine" under section 482 to reallocate the net income of the entire venture to
one taxpayer. Thus, the device clause may well be the Service's
last major line of defense in this area since the accumulated
earnings tax imposes only an upper limit on the amount of postdistribution earnings that can be bailed out by this technique, or
more aptly device.
Impairment ·of Equity

The appellate opinion approvingly quoted commentators defining a bail-out as a drawing off of earnings and profits without
impairing the shareholder's residual equity interest in the ongoing
corporation's earning power, growth potential or voting control.
The court added little to this definition other than to indicate that
a device was not present if retention of the spun-off salable
assets was needed to continue the business or if their sale would
harm the taxpayer's control and other equity interest.
Impairment of voting control appears at first blush clear-cut;
however, the question of the degree to which attribution rules
are to be applied to determine voting control before and after
the division is not as clear. No exact parallel to impairment of
growth potential and earning power is presented under existing
Code provisions. The "essentially equivalent to a dividend" provisions 108 offer the closest analogy since they, too, are concerned
with bail-outs. Indeed, in the application of the "strict net effect"
doctrine 109 developed under section 302(b){l), one court has gone
l.06Ibiil. (assignment of income doctrine, sections 446(b) and 48:1 can be employed
if anticipated manipulation occurs).
1.01 Reg. §§ 1.482-2(c)(l) and (2).
10s See I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(l), 346(a)(2), and 356(a)(2); Reg. § 1.30G-3(d) ("cash
substitution" test).
1o9 Under the "strict net effect" test, a court hypothesizes a situation where tho
corporation did not redeem any stock, but instead declared a dividend in an amount
equal to the amount actually distributed in exchnngo for the stock redeemed. Then it
compares, from the shareholder's vantage point, the "hypothetical" situation after
the dividend with the actual situation after the redemption. Tho redemption is "essen·
tially equivalent to a dividend" whenever tho results (e.g., payments received and
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beyond mere hypothetical dividend consequences to consider relative changes with respect to shareholder rights to share in corporate earnings and to share in net assets on liquidation. 110
However, because this approach is intended to focus on changes
at the shareholder level, its utility in development of the concept
of impairment of equity would be limited to non pro rata distributions. Arguably, such distributions can never be used to bail out
earnings and profits where the distributee shareholders' interests
in the controlling corporation are completely terminated. Therefore, consideration of the net effect test is appropriate only where
there has been a meaningful reduction of the distributee shareholders' interests in the remaining corporation,111 but not a complete termination.
At least where section 355 distributions are proportionate,112
guidance as to the contours of the impairment of equity doctrine
must be sought in dividend equivalency approaches other than
the net effect test. The Rafferty focus on whether sale of the
spun-off real estate would impair the continued operation of the
ongoing steel company business calls to mind the ''corporate
contraction'' doctrine 113 applied to partial liquidations under
section 346(a) (2). This doctrine, however, in its pristine form is
broader than impairment of equity since it would permit, for
example, distribution of the proceeds of sale of unwanted operating assets and the working capital attributable to termination of
a business activity. 114 Guidance here would therefore be limited
to whether the distribution (not termination) of a part of the
ongoing business is sufficient to contract or restrict the continuance of the ongoing corporation's operations. Even if the sale
of the distributed assets would impair the continued operations,
the pattern of stockholder control) from the hypothetical dividend and tho actual
redemption are the same.
110 Himmel v. Comm 'r, 338 F.2d 815, 818-20 (2d Cir. 1964).
111 Cf. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970); Note, United States v. Davis:
What Remains of Section 802(b)(1)?, 13 Wlii. & MARY L. REV. 202, 208-09 (1971).
112 It is possible that whore distributions are disproportionate tho taxpnyor will
have to show that the sale of the distributed stock would not only impair his equity
interests ("net effect") in the distributing corporation but also would impair its
continued operations ("contraction"). However, Rafferty speaks of those two facota
of impairment of equity in the alternative.
ua One commentator has reasoned that a functional division involving for example
assets connected with a coal mine or a research department would result in 11 a cor·
porate contraction in operating assets'' and accordingly concluded that such divisions
merit tax deferral. Massee, Section 855: Disposal of Unwanted .d.ssets in Connection
with a Reorganigation, 22 TAX L. REV. 439, 463 (1967).
114 Rev. Rul. 60-232, 1960-2 C.B. 115.
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Rafferty implies that the further question of whether the ongoing
corporation can readily replace such assets must be asked. 116
The uncertainties which exist in the contraction doctrine
prompted the active business safe harbor of section 346(b). Thus,
paradoxically, Rafferty has swung full circle from the section 355
active business restriction intended to police bail-outs to an impairment of capital approach similar to the judicial doctrine which
in another provision led to adoption of an active business provision
as a safe harbor. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the perimeters of this concept are yet to be fully charted and that it may
prove to be the soft spot of the Rafferty approach in terms of
predictability for tax planning, it is more responsive than the
active business requirement to the question of whether the transaction offers such bail-out potentiality that it is not entitled
to tax deferral. The active business restriction suffers from being
both too narrow and broad since whether the transaction satisfies
the active business rules has very little effect on the determination of device.U6
In addition to unanswered questions as to what constitutes an
impairment of equity, an unresolved issue going to the heart of
the concept of bail-out potentiality is the continued significance
under this doctrine of postdistribution sales. The question is presented by alternative constructions of the impairment of equity
factor: (1) if a sale would impair the taA.!)ayer's equity in the
continuing business, even should it occur such a sale would not
likely result in a bail-out, or (2) if a sale would impair the taxpayer's equity, the likelihood of a sale itself would be slight and,
therefore, the likelihood of a bail-out via a sale would. also be
slight. The significance of the latter construction is in its basic
premise that any sale (even one which impairs residual equity)
constitutes strong evidence of a device. Although both interpretations would lead to the same result as long as there is no sale,
ns Clearly the distributing corporation would require some facilities (the spun-off
assets consisted primarily of its business premises) in which to conduct its stecl
operations. Rafferty held that the land and buildings in which the distributing cor·
poration carried on its steel operations were not so distinctive that their sale would
impair the continuance of those operations. Consequently, tbe court must have meant
that their sale would not impair tbe continuance of tbe business of the ongoing com·
pany beeause they could be easily replaced.
ua As the Rafferty opinion points out, "[e]ven if both corporations are actively
engaged in their respective trades, if one of tbem is a business based principally on
highly liquid investment-type passive assets, tbc potential for a bail-out is re!ll.''
452 F.2d at 771.
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different conclusions might be reached where a postdistribution
sale did occur.
The question is drawn into sharper focus by examination of
Bittker and Eustice's critical analysis of the theory that a postdistribution sale is a method of bailing out earnings and profits.
They point out :
Such a sale spells a loss of control of one of the businesses (and a
loss of the seller's share in the corporation's earning power and growth
potential as well), whereas a bail-out ordinarily means that earnings
and profits have been drawn off without impairing the shareholder's
residual equity interest in the corporation's earning power, growth
potential, or voting control. 117

Assuming that the active business test did not permit segregation
of cash or investment property in a corporation and distribution
of its stock under section 355, they concluded that the bail-out
analogy was invalid.118 Thus, their analysis indicated that a sale,
prearranQ;ed or not, of stock of a postdistribution corporation that
was actively conducting a trade or business could not constitute a
device. However, under the Rafferty active business test liquid
assets can be held in an active corporation (for example, rental
real estate business not restricted to granting net leases). Consequently, merely passing the active business test cannot preclude
a finding that the transaction violated the device test. But if the
sale would impair the taxpayer's equity interest in the continuing
corporation, then, following the logic of these commentators'
reasoning, such a sale would not be analogous to a bail-out. Since
this appears the only possible synthesis of the Rafferty active
business approach and Bittker and Eustice's critique of the bailout concept, it is probable that the court intended that impairment
of equity made the likelihood of a bail-out minimal even if there
were a postdistribution sale. In addition, it may be argued that
had the court meant to equate such a sale with a bail-out as the
other construction does, it could have done so expressly.
The factors militating towards an interpretation in which a
bail-out is equated with sale (but such a sale is unlikely because
it would impair the continuing equity interest) do not arise from
the theory underlying the bail-out concept or its common meaning
but rather from the context in which the court used the term.
For example, the court stated:
117 BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SnARE•
HOLDERS

13-28 (3d

eel.

1971).

us I d. at 13-29.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

1972]

THE RAFFERTl' CASE

485

If the taxpayers could not effect a bail-out without thereby impairing
their control over the on-going business, the faet that a bail-out is
theoretically possible should not be enough to demonstrate a device
because the likelihood of it ever being so used is slight.110

Yet under the Bittker and Eustice view, a sale which would impair
such control could never constitute a bail-out and, thus, is not e\·en
theoretically possible. However, if the word sale is substituted
for ''bail-out,'' the same contradiction does not arise. Thus, bailout seems to possess a broader meaning in Rafferty. Furthermore,
the court stated that if a sale would adversely affect the ta.xpayer's
residual equity, the assets could not be said to be sufficiently
separated from the corporate solution and the gain sufficiently
crystallized to be taxable. The authority for this statement, an
earlier First Circuit split-off and liquidation-reincorporation decision, contains a paraphrase of it that served merely as a reformulation of the continuity of interest doctrine.12° Consequently,
if the Rafferty hypothesis that a sale which impairs residual equity
does not constitute a device due to the slight likelihood of its use
to ·bail out earnings and profits, is tested against the original
version and context of this crystallization of gain metaphor, it
fails. For a sale of the taxpayer's total interest in one of the
postdistribution corporations violates the continuity of interest
doctrine. To coexist with the continuity of interest doctrine impairment of capital must render both a sale and a bail-out highly
unlikely, thus, the terms might as well be synonymous.
While equating sale and bail-out solves some minor conceptual
lacunae in the Rafferty opinion, to do so requires more than a
little casuistic reasoning. More fundamentally, the position that
a sale is not a device if it impairs residual equity and therefore
is probably not being used as a bail-out, is more consistent with
119 Rafferty

v. Comm.'r, 452 F.2d 767, 771 (1st Cir. 1971).
Lewis v. Comm 'r, 176 F.2d 646, 649 (1st Cir. 1949): "What is controlling is
that in both the 'popular and economic sense', and the intendment of the statute,
considerations of 'boot' aside, gain or loss is not sufficiently crystallized for recognition by the mere transfer of a going business to another corporation for operation
indefinitely; 'the collective interests still remained in solution. 1 "
Liquidation-reincorporation refers to the situation in whieh shareholders of the 11 old
corporation" liquidate it, withdraw accumulated earnings usunlly in the form of
cash at capital gain rates, and obtain a stepped-up fair market value basis for tho
other assets, which are then transferred with a carryover basis to a "new corporation"
owned in substantially the same proportions. One of the Service's counteraUnc.ks is
that the entire transaction constitutes a reorganization with the ensh being distributed
as a boot dividend under seetion 356(a.)(2), or preferably as a. functionally unrelated
dividend under section 30L
120
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a transactional approach. The latter interpretation should and is
likely to be the accepted reading of the Rafferty decision and the
significance of postdistribution sales, prearranged or not, and the
continuity of interest doctrine may be expected to be minimal
where the Rafferty approach is followed.
A ramification of the bail-out potential approach involves a
transaction that eliminates residual equity in one of the postdistribution corporations, such as a non pro rata split-up or
split-off in which each group of shareholders possesses a continuing interest in only one of the corporations resulting from the
division. Certainly a sale by one of the groups of their entire
interest cannot be used to bail out earnings, rather it is more like
a complete termination of interest.121 It should be noted that here
the usual alternative to tax deferral will not be ordinary income,
but
would presumably constitute a redemption in complete termination of
the interest of one group of stockholders, so that the only tax incidents
(absent § 355) would be at capital gains rates on those stockholders who
give up their old stock in exchange for the stock of the new corporation.
Nevertheless, the failure to obtain complete tax immunity in such circumstances could seriously impede the resolution of deadlock situations,
since it would add to the other issues in controversy the question of
which group of stockholders should bear this capital gains tax. 122

While the absence of an equity interest in both corporations removes the danger of a bail-out, it also removes the brake on
postdistribution sales of corporate assets with readily realizable
value. In these circumstances it might be felt that the gain is
sufficiently crystallized to be recognized; however, to do so
would entail resuscitating the pre-Rafferty version of the active
business restriction or giving the continuity of interest doctrine
untoward emphasis. The simplest solution, therefore, is to grant
tax deferral to divisions with complete terminations of interest
in one of the resulting corporations if they pass the Rafferty
121 Cf. Rev. Rul. 64-102, 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 136; accord, Rev, Rul. 71-593, 1971-2
C.B. 181, which said that in the absence of section 355, the trnnsaction would have
been taxed as a capital gain to distributees under tho termination of interest rcdemp·
tion safe harbor; therefore, no potential dividend income was being bnilcd out of tho
parent and, consequently, the transaction did not violate the device clause.
122 HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 932 (1966). Sections 302(b) (2) and (b) (3)
provide mechanical tests under which redemptions qualify for capital gain treat·
ment. Significantly under the latter safe harbor ("complete termination of inter•
est") the attribution rules of section 318 are waived in some, but not all, instances.
I.R.C. § 302(c) (2).
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active business requirement.123 Should this approach prove to be
a means of avoiding the attribution rules applicable to a complete termination of interest under the redemption provisions, a
solution would be to use those rules to determine whether the
transaction has bail-out potential, i.e., attribute to such ta.'\.-payers
the residual interest of related parties in the other corporation
and then determine whether a sale would impair such interest.12'
This is another area in which the expanded device test is a more
flexible guard against bail-outs than the active business requirement. Since the latter does not draw a distinction between pro
rata and non pro rata divisions, any stretching of the active business test to permit a particular non pro rata separation worthy of
tax deferral becomes equally applicable to pro rata divisions.
The Sixth Circuit in King, in its application of the Rafferty
bail-out potential approach, manifests some of the difficulties in
this approach. The Tax Court had not reached the Commissioner's
device or business purpose alternative contentions, and the government on appeal argued that if the active business issue were
reversed, the case should be remanded to the Ta.x Court for
further :findings on these issues. A concurring and dissenting
opinion agreed, but the majority, apparently not fully comprehending the Rafferty reformulation of device, proceeded to rule
on these issues as well.
Its starting point was that all the transactions involved were
motivated by valid business purposes. Next it concluded that
since the stock of spun-off corporations was immediately exchanged in an amalgamating reorganization for stock in a sister
corporation of the distributing parent corporation (thus the distributee stockholders owned both a trucking corporation and a
separate holding company with terminal leasing subsidiaries), the
distributed stocks were locked into the holding company as securely
as they had been locked into the parent truck line operating cor123 See Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog: ..4. New .J.pproacl1 to Corporate
Separations Under the 1954 Coile, 81 HARV. L. REV. 11941 1::!55 (19GS) (proposed
burd~n test should not apply to transactions im·olving business diviBions between
shareholders or complete termination of any shareholder's interest via a split·ofi
because these transactions are not capable of being used ns bill-outs).
124 Although the attribution rules under section 318 are applicable only where
expressly made so, I.R.C. § 318(a), and are not referred to in section 355, Revenue
Ruling 64-102, 1964-1 C.B. (Part 1) 136, indicated a solution: The attribution rules
would not be directly applied; rather the section 355 distribution would be compared
with a hypothetical section 302 redemption (to which section 318 is e:qm:ssly mado
applicable) to determine whether the transaction is capable of being used to bill out
dividend income.
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poration beforehand, ''and the stockholders were as far removed
from the earnings and profits after the distribution as they had
been before, and could not abstract any accumulated earnings at
capital gain rates.'' 125 Thus, the majority concluded the distribution could not have been used as a device. This reasoning overlooks
the fact that if the terminals had a readily realizable value and
their sale would not impair the stockholder's control over the
ongoing trucking business, the potential for a bail-out through
sale of the separate holding company is real-the holding company
stock was not necessarily locked into the trucking company at all.
The King majority also held that (1) unlike the real estate in
Rafferty which was readily salable because the improvements
were capable of multiple use, the terminals were "single-purpose
facilities which required specialized equipment and construction,''
(2) the retention of the properties by the spun off corporations
was necessary for them to obtain financing and expand their
facilities, and (3) a sale or liquidation would have impaired the
continued operations of the ongoing trucking company. The
second holding is irrelevant to bail-out potential analysis-sale
of the spun-off assets would always impair the shareholder's
equity in the spun-off corporation; the question is whether it.
impairs their equity in the retained corporation and assets. rrhe
difficulty with the first and third holdings is that nowhere in the
Tax Court or appellate opinions are there findings as to whether
the spun-off terminals were readily salable, and if so, whether
sufficiently similar terminals were available for leasing or could
be constructed, or whether a sale and leaseback was possible.
Without the answers to these questions the majority's conchlsions
here, although patterned after Rafferty, were without support in
the record. It would appear that the majority was overly influenced by its conclusions that the shareholders had received in
the distribution no cash or cash equivalent with which to pay the
tax and that all the. transactions were motivated by business
purposes.
125 458 F.2d at 250. Both the Tax Court and the appellate opuuon confusingly
speak of the holding company that acquired the distributt'<l stock in ono plnco ns n
subsidiary of the distributing corporation and as another corporntion owned by tho
shareholders of the distributing corporation, i.e., a sister corporution. Since tlw not result
and ostensible purpose of all the transactions was to place nil of tho trucking corporations in one group and all of the trucking terminal corporations in nnothor, it
is assumed that the holding company was a sister corporation to tho tru<'king common
parent corporation. Otherwise after the second reorganization in which tho hohllng
company acquired the distributed stock, it would have remained partially owned by
the distributing corporation.
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Business Purpose

In Rafferty, the court found that the transaction was in other
respects a device and, in addition, the taxpayers' personal estate
planning motives were not germane to the continuance of the
corporate business since the need to prevent any future management conflict that might arise from debilitating nepotism was
remote and completely within the taxpayers' control. Therefore,
the taxpayers did not satisfy their burden of proving that the
distribution was not being used principally as a bail-out device.
Significantly, the court did not use the terms ''purposes . . .
germane to the business of the corporation" (the formulation of
business purpose under section 1.355-2(c) of the regulations)
but rather ''motives ... germane to the continuance of the corporate business.'' 126
This formulation of business purpose highlights the fact that in
the eyes of the court the concept of shareholder business purpose
is linked with the impairment of equity factor. For if the shareholder motives are so germane, a postdistribution sale would probably retard their fulfillment. Although interrelated to the impairment of equity factor, this element is not identical to it.
For example, the spun-off corporation's assets could consist of
real estate leased to the ongoing company that the latter could
readily replace without contracting its continued operations. If
the shareholder's motives were such that for other reasons he
could not as a practical matter dispose of either of the postdistribution corporations, then the purposes would appear germane
to the continuance of the corporate business.127 In effect, under
this approach a taxpayer is given another bite at the apple to
show that the likelihood of a bail-out is slight. If he cannot show
that a sale would impair his continuing equity so that the likelihood of its use for a bail-out is slight, he may show that the likeliRafferty v. C-omm 'r, 452 F.2d 767, 770 (1st Cir. 1971).
Bondy v. Comm'r, 269 F.2d 463, 466-67 (4th Cir. 19li9). Wliitman Buggests that
the taxpayer in Bondy had no intention of disposing of the spun-off real estate stock
which was collateral for his alimony obligation. "If h;:> defaulted on the alimony, his
ex-wife would become his lessor. Business purpose or none, 111:' did not, eould not, contemplate a bail-out of earnings, and thus the trallS3ction wns not used as a device."
81 !IARv. L. REV. at 1243.
The Eafferty business purpose discussion required that p;:>rsonnl sharel1older moti\·es
be germane to the continuance of the corporate business if tho transaction was in
other respects a. device; in its summary of device the court concluded that the continued
rentention of the salable assets was not needed to accomplish shareholder purposes.
It may be inferred that shareholder purposes requiring retention of assets nrc ger·
mane to continuance of the corporate business.
126
121
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hood of a sale itself occurring (and hence a bail-out via such sale)
is slight due to the fact that personal motives require ''the continued retention [of the salable assets] to accomplish [his] purposes.'' 128
Rafferty retained, of course, corporate business purpose as a
possible means of showing that a transaction is not being used
principally as a device, although it is, in other respects, a device.
Indeed, the majority opinion in King may be justified on this
ground. The dissent, however, believed that valid business purposes did not necessarily foreclose a finding that a transaction is
used as a device. The apparent criterion for determining if a
corporate business purpose is present is whether the transaction
renders ''any direct benefit to the business of the original company." Rafferty unfortunately does not indicate what degree
of business purpose (corporate or shareholder germane to continuance of the· corporate business) must be shown to establish
that the transaction was not being used "principally as a device"
where the potential for a. bail-out is real. The principal purpose
test of section 269 may offer some guidance. Regulations under
that section, echoing legislative history-'' the section should be
operative only if the evasion or avoidance purpose outranks, or
exceeds in importance, any other one purpose'' 1211-provide that
"[i]f the purpose to evade or avoid Federal income tax exceeds
in importance any other purpose, it is the principal purpose." 130
This leads to the interesting question of whether a transaction is
used principally as a device if the bail-out purpose exceeds in
importance both a shareholder purpose germane to continuance
of the enterprise and a corporate business purpose, when measured
against each purpose separately, but not when measured against
both of them. The fact that the everyday sense of principally is
"of first importance" or "primarily," as contrasted with "essential" or "substantial," 131 suggests that the bail-out use must
exceed all business purpose uses in the aggregate.
If, however, the development of the "business purpose" limitations of section 269 is fully applicable to section 355, this question
452 F.2d at 771.
S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1943).
13o Reg. § 1.269-3(a)(2).
131 Cf. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966) ("primarily" in section 1221(1)
means "principally" or "of first importance''); see COLSON, FE!DERAL TAXATION OF
SALES, EXCHANGES AND OTHER TRANSFERS 61 (1971) (suggesting Malat ovorrulcd
a conflicting interpretation of "essential" or "substantial").
12s

129
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may well prove academic since the courts, at least prior to recent
trends, have seemed willing to give decisive weight to any reasonable business purpose posited by the taxpayer. Nevertheless,
''courts generally have been more receptive to the business reasons which would justify separation of assets at the corporate
level than to attempt to attain split ownership at the shareholder
level under § 355,'' 132 and a business purpose is required for both
the initial separation of assets into subsidiary status and the
distribution of the subsidiary's stock to the parent's shareholders.133
In the context of the requirement of a separate business purpose
for distribution of the stock of the spun-off corporation, the
Rafferty court's observation that the alleged business purpose
could be fully satisfied by a bail-out of dividends may prove highly
significant. For Parshelsky, the decision adopting the requirement
of nontax reasons, not only for the corporate division but also for
direct ownership of both corporations by the shareholders, had
reasoned that a business purpose which could be accomplished
merely by separate incorporation could not justify a spin-off.134
Due to this reasoning, commentators generalized that if a distribution by a spin-off was only one of several ways to accomplish
a given purpose, courts might hold that the spin-off did not possess
an adequate nontax purpose.135 In Raffedy, the court pointed out
that the alleged business purpose of providing daughters with
investment assets safe from the fluctuations of the .ongoing steel
business could have been fully satisfied by payment of cash
dividends to the taxpayers followed by their investing them to
provide for their female descendents. This may portend an
approach under which a business purpose for a spin-off is severely
discounted if the same result could be obtained through payment
of dividends.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that since the result
secured under most spin-offs (including some approved by the
Service in published rulings) can be achieved without a distribution, the possibility of accomplishing the same result without a spinoff should not be determinative tall_,' [m] en may arrange their
132 BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL !NCOYE TAXATION OF CoRPORATIONS A..,'D SIIAilli:•
HOLDERS 15-10
133 Estate of

(3d ed. 1971).
Parshelsky v. Comm 'r, 303 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1962).

134Ibiil.
1as Cohen, Current Partial Liquidatwn and Spin-off Problems, 41 TAXES 7751 779-80
(1963).
136 lit. at 778.
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affairs with an eye to reducing or avoiding taxes." 137 Moreover,
even under section 269 where the previously liberal judicial attitude towards business purpose has turned critical, the hardened
attitude ''does not go so far as to compel the taxpayer to adopt
the least favorable tax route out of several possible alternatives." 138 Indeed, in a recent section 355 decision where the Government argued that ''assuming that there was a business purpose
for the creation of the new company there was no business purpose for the distribution of its stock since the same objective could
have been accomplished by operating the new company as a
subsidiary," the district court countered with the observation
that ''it does not follow that a spin-off, prompted by valid business
motives, can be taxed merely by showing that the same business
purposes could have been served by some other form of reorganization." 139 Thus, it is not advisable to hold that a spin off which
in other respects is not a device does not possess an adequate
business purpose merely because the same result could be obtained by a payment of cash dividends. Rather, under section
355, as under section 269, the rule should be that the taxpayer
must show that the choice of the more favorable tax route was
motivated by business reasons at least equal to the opportunity
to obtain the potential tax benefits in the method selected, viz., a
bail-out of earnings and profits.
A further business purpose question not directly answered by
Rafferty is whether such a purpose must be evidenced for application of section 355 even though the distributed stock cannot be
potentially converted into cash without impairing the distributee's
equity interest in the continuing corporation. 'l1he Ninth Circuit
in Commissioner v. Wilson 140 has held that business purpose
.was an independent test which must be met even after the device
clause had been satisfied. It is significant, therefore, that tho
Rafferty court appears to use business purpose as a threshold
question which is triggered only by the presence of bail-out
potential:
[I] f, in other respects the transaction was a "device," that purpose
could not satisfy the taxpayers' burden of proving that it was not being
used "principally as a device" . . . .
137

Electrical Securities Corp. v. Comm 'r, 92 F.2d 593, 595 (2d Cir. 1937).

138 Bl'l'TKE& & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SIIAIIE·
HOLDERS

16-38 {3d ed. 1971).

1ao Hanson v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 602, 613 (D. Mont. 1971).
140

353 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir. 1965).
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Accordingly, once the stock was distributed, if it could poto1tially be
converted into cash withmd thereby impairing taxpayers' equity interest
in RBS, the transaction could easily be used to avoid taxes. The
business purpose here alleged, which could be fully satisfied by a bail-out
of dividends, is not sufficient to prove that the transaction was not being
principally so used.
In the absence of any direct benefit to the business of the original company, and on a slwwing that the spin-off put saleable assets in the
lumds of the taxpayers, the continued retention of 1vhich teas 11ot 11eeded
to continue the business enterprise, or to accomplish taxpayers' purposes,
... the distribution was principally a device to distribute earnings and
profits.141

Furthermore, the court stated that it preferred this application of
the device test to reliance upon formulations such as business
purpose or active business, citing Whitman, who in this context
was quite critical of the appellate opinion in Wilson, pointing
out it downgraded the device concept to a mere formality.142
Thus, it may be concluded that under the Rafferty approach,
business purpose is merely an element that the ta.'\."Payer must
prove if the transaction offers bail-out potentiality, but has no
independent significance beyond this limited role.
Consequently, where the taxpayer shows that the transaction
displays no real potential for a bail-out and the reformulated
active business test is met, he should prevail even in the absence
of a business purpose, Wilson notwithstanding, since he has satisfied his burden that it was not being used "principally as a
device." This approach corresponds nicely to an analysis of the
reference to earnings and profits as suggesting a dividend equivalence focus and the use of device as implying a tax avoidance concept (which invokes a business purpose defense). It may be
significant that the assets (conditional sales contracts) of the
spun-off corporation in Wilson were highly liquid and that a sale
of its stock would not appear to adversely affect the shareholders
of the ongoing retail furniture company, so that the result reached
would not vary under the Rafferty device test, only the reasoning.
Indeed, the central weakness of the Wilson approach is high141 Rafferty

v. Comm'r, 452 F.2d 767, 770-71 (1st Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
Rafferty's bail-out potentiality approach is better suited to policing spin·offs
of active businesses than an independent business purpose test. Thus, the apprehension
by some commentators that without the Wilson rule a bail-out of e!lrnings could be
accomplished by a three or five year ''holding period'' should be allayed.
142
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lighted by the recent Hanson decision.l4 3 There, the court found
adequate business purposes for the separation of a financing business that also satisfied the active business requirement. The Commissioner having conceded that the transaction was not a device,
the taxpayer prevailed.
DEviCE AND BusiNEss PuRPOSE REGULATIONS
AFTER Rafferty
An evaluation of the section 355 device and busness purpose
regulations in light of Rafferty does not reveal the broad sweep
repudiation evident in the active business regulations. Rather the
primary impression is one of a reordering of priorities in the
weight and role of their elements. An exception may be found in
the postdistribution sales provisions of the device regulations 144
which, though previously the most critical aspect of these regulations, appear for the most part no longer relevant and certainly
not conclusive or even presumptive. Although not directly criticized in the opinion, they are not consonant with the rationale
supporting the bail-out potential approach. If a sale of one of the
postdistribution corporations impairs the taxpayer's equity in
the other corporation, the sale has not likely been used as a bailout; on the other hand, if a sale would not impair such equity
and the assets are readily salable, "the substance of the transaction is such as to leave the taxpayer in a position to distribute
the earnings and profits of the corporation away from, or out of
the business" 145 regardless of whether a sale actually occurs.
Possibly, postdistribution sales could be a factor in the infrequent situations in which the assets do not have a readily realizable value but their actual sale, nevertheless, does not impair the
taxpayer's interest in the ongoing corporation or the potential
for bail-out is real but shareholder motives germane to the continuance of the corporate business are shown. In both cases, the
bail-out which appeared highly unlikely (only b<'cause a sale
appeared unlikely) has, in fact, occurred through a postdistribution sale.
The focus of these regulations on the proportion of active business or liquid assets 146 is both amplified and narrowed by Rafferty.
Whether the stock of one of the postdistribution corporations can
Hanson v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mont. 1971),
Reg. §§ 1.355-2(b) (1) and (2).
Hs 452 F.2d at 771.
146 Reg. § 1.355-2(b)(2).

143

144
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be potentially or readily converted into cash has now become a
critical question. It is not determinative, however, since tht> potential for a bail-out is not real unless such sale would also not
impair the taxpayer's equity interest in the other corporation.
This limitation, which is nowhere contained in the existing device
regulations, is a definite restriction on them.
Business purpose and continuity of interest 147 still play a role
since shareholder business purpose and continuity of interest,
in the limited sense of continuity of the business enterprise, are
in effect melded into a single requirement that retention of the
spun-off assets must be needed to accomplish the shareholder's
purpose (if the spin-off puts salable assets in the hands of
shareholders and their continued retention is not needed to continue the business enterprise-continuity of interest again).
Similarly, the need to show a corporate benefit or business purpose where shareholders motives will not meet the above test is
triggered by bail-out potential. In summary, the theory of
Rafferty~ though not the express language, indicates that business
purpose and the modified continuity of interest requirement do
not exist independently of the device test as the regulations imply
and the Service asserts.
Conclusion

The First Circuit's election in Rafferty to rely primarily on the
device clause to police bail-outs offers a new approach to section
355, one long demanded by commentators. Whether that approach,
which was accompanied by a deliberate abrogation of most of
the elements of the already shaky active business regulations, will
mature and introduce predictability to this area will turn on two
imponderables: (1) the course taken by the "modification" of the
regulations that the Treasury has been considering for eight years,
and (2) the degree to which the new formulations of device,
active business and business purpose, as well as the radiations
of the Rafferty reasoning (and dicta) are perceived and followed
by subsequent decisions.
The viability of the present active business regulations is no
longer debatable; if the Service attempts to resuscitate them as
the principal barrier to bail-outs, further taxpayer challenges to
their validity can only result. Viewed solely from the vanta~e point
of section 355, Rafferty presents a blueprint for regulations that
147Reg. § 1.355-2(c).
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would maintain a more precise and reliable screen against potential bail-outs but permit other transactions to pass unscathed. If
the court's bail-out potentiality approach-(1) where salable
assets are placed in the hands of shareholders with interests in
both postdistribution corporations, and (2) their retention is not
needed to continue the business of the other corporation, then
(and only then) (3) the taxpayer must show that either their
retention is necessary to accomplish his business purpose, or
(4) that the distribution serves a corporate purpose equal to or
greater than the bail-out opportunity-is substituted for the
present device and business purpose regulations, the active business reg-ulations could be safely reduced to a quantitative and
qualitative corporate activities test that distinguishes corporate
operations from mere investments. Thus, whatever apprehension
the Service may have had that liberalizing the active business
regulations would open the floodgates for a deluge of bail-outs
should be alleviated by adoption of the Rafferty tack in the device
regulations along with the revision of the active business regulations. Furthermore, although the purposes of the active business
rule and device requirement have always overlapped/48 this step
would restore the active business rule to supplementing, not supplanting, the device clause.
The partial liquidation provisions of section 346 and the active
business regulations issued thereunder, which expressly incorporate the active business definition of section 1.355-2 (c) of the
regulations, contain no counterpart to the device clause of section
355. Thus, this too may be a factor in the Treasury's gestation
period for modifications of the section 355 regulations. It should
be noted, however, that the chief, though not the sole, conceptual
weakness in the present regulations is that they are bottomed on
the rejected separate business requirement. Yett under section
346, that requirement is dictated by the clear language of the
statute and, indeed, the section 346 requirement may have been
the inspiration for the two business restrictions contained in the
section 355 regulations. 140 Thus, portions of these regulations may
be salvaged for application to section 346 only. In any event if that
E. Ward King, 55 T.C. 677, 696, n.7 (1971).
Some legislative history also suggested this construction, and with tho promises:
(1) the reduction in scope that would occur in the division of a single business in l1nlvos
prevented each from qualifying as the same "such trade or business" as hn<l existed
before the distribution and (2) that "such trade or business" in section 355(b)(2) (B)
referred to the same predistribution active business required by section 355(b) (1), tho
statute itself supported the two business requirement. See Reg. § 1.355-1 (d) Ex. 11.
148

149
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alternative is not chosen, section 346 would not be the only active
business provision unaccompanied by explanatory or definitional
regulations.150 The ultimate resolution of this problem lies perhaps in a congressional exploration of whether a modification of
the Rafferty device is a suitable substitute under section 346 for
the present active business safe harbor.
Case law development will probably follow Rafferty with
respect to its reformulation of device-King is a current example.
A possible exception may arise as to the role of business purpose
since the Ninth Circuit has held that it must be shown regardless
of whether the device clause is satisfied, and the First Circuit did
not expressly hold on this question. Rather the latter's ju.·daposition of bail-out potentiality and business purpose as well as its
preference of device over active business and business purpose to
police bail-outs only suggests that it would disagree with Wilson.
In any event, if the Rafferty position on device is followed, it is
to be hoped that its deemphasis of active business will also be
followed. For the two are but the faces of a single coin-the
transactional approach.
As to the First Circuit's view of the active business requirement, King also evidences that the express pronouncements (even
where dicta) on functional divisions, independent production of
income and corporations dealing only with related entities will
prevail. Whether other courts will limit the active business test
to a requirement of objective indicia of entrepreneurial activities
quantitatively and qualitatively, distinguishing corporate operations from mere investments, is a harder question. In addition, the
effect the radiations of Rafferty will have in the Ta.'"{ Court
on the continuing precedent value of such Tax Court decisions as
the Elliot trilogy and the more recent cases of Spheeris and King
is not possible to predict at this point. Hopefully, however, theTa.'"{
Court will give serious reconsideration to its previous stance on
the section 355 active business clause now that a reinterpretation
of the device clause is available and the existing active business
regulations have been seriously, even fatally, questioned by two
circuit opinions. While under the facts of many of these decisions the results would not vary under the new approach, this
would not be the case in non pro rata divisions or pro rata
separations in which the salable real estate was so distinctive
that its sale would impair the ongoing corporation's operations.
Rafferty has signaled a new beginning under section 355; hopelso See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 274, 921(2), 931(n)(2), 1551, nnd 1372(e)(5)(B)(i).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

498

TAX LAW REVIEW

fully it will be followed uniformly and administratively without
an ensuing decade of taxpayer uncertainty and perplexed commentary, as has been the situation after Coady. But if that millenium does not arrive, the bail-out potentiality concept can also
serve as a blueprint for Congress to ''enable the business community to adjust more freely its methods of conducting business''
and at the same time to effectively isolate an attempted bail-out
of earnings and profits from a valid corporate readjustment. 1G1
151

Note, Section 355 's Active Business Rule-An Outdated Inefficacy, 24

VAND.

'REV. 955, 956 (1971).
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